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Sexual Autonomy and the
Constitutional Right to Privacy: A
Case Study in Human Rights and
the Unwritten Constitution
By DAVID A.J. RICHARDS*
From its recognition in Griswold v. Connecticut,' the constitutional
right to privacy commonly has been attacked as expressing subjective
judicial ideology, as lacking a constitutionally neutral principle, and as
being, in substance, a form of legislative policy not properly pursued by
the courts.2 In particular, critics, both on 3 and off the Supreme Court,
4
have questioned the methodology of the Court in inferring an in-
dependent constitutional right to privacy that is not within the contours
of the rights expressly guaranteed by the Constitution; in brief, how can
the Court legitimately appeal to an unwritten constitution when the
point of the constitutional design was to limit governmental power by a
written text?
The summary affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for
Richmond,5 which could be read as excluding homosexual acts between
* Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. A.B., 1966,
Harvard College; D. Phil., 1970, Oxford University; J.D., 1971, Harvard Law School. Mem-
ber, New York Bar.
This Article profited from the essential advice of Donald Levy, Brooklyn College
(Philosophy).
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. See generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf.A.4 Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973); Comment, Roe v. Wade-The Abortion Decision-An Analysis and Its
Implications, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 844, 848-51 (1973); Note, Roe v. Wade and Doe v.
Bolton: The Compelling State Interest Test in Substantive Due Process, 30 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 628, 634-35, 642-43 (1973).
3. Thus, Justice Black complained in his dissent that the majority opinion was "natu-
ral justice" in disguise. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-12 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), afrg without opinion 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-
judge court). In Doe, two homosexuals challenged the constitutionality of Virginia's crimi-
nal sodomy statute as applied to private acts between consenting adults. The challenge was
based on the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the first amend-
ment guarantee of freedom of expression, the first and ninth amendment guarantee of the
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consenting adults from the scope of the constitutional right to privacy,
may give compelling force to these kinds of objections. The Court may
have summarily limited the right to privacy in a way that suggests fiat,
not articulated principle, for how can the Court in a principled way
sustain the constitutional right to privacy of married and unmarried
people to use contraceptives 6 or to have abortions7 or to use pornogra-
phy in the privacy of one's home,8 and not sustain the rights of con-
senting adult homosexuals to engage in the form of sex they find
natural?
This author believes that the constitutional right to privacy is a
sound and defensible development in our constitutional jurisprudence
that the summary affirmance in Doe betrays. 9 This Article will attempt
to explicate the jurisprudential foundations of the constitutional right
to privacy and to explain, paripassu, wherein Doe errs.
The Article begins with a philosophical explication of human
rights as that concept is institutionalized in American constitutional
law. Such an examination will give solid foundation to the idea of an
unwritten constitution underlying the terms of the written Constitution.
The Article then examines three interconnecting variables, antimoral-
ism, antipaternalism, and the moral value of autonomy, to explain how
the idea of human rights justifies a constitutional right to privacy cor-
rectly applied to contraceptives, abortions, and the private use of por-
nography, as well as to consensual adult homosexual acts.
The Concept of Human Rights as an Unwritten Constitution
The constitutional power of judicial review is marked by two sali-
ent structural features. First, such review is intrinsically
countermajoritarian. The Constitution clearly was intended to put le-
gal constraints on majority power, whether exercised by the legislature
or by the executive. Second, the basis of this countermajoritarian ap-
peal appears to be ideas of human rights that, by definition, govern-
ment has no moral title to transgress. Under the constitutional order,
certain human rights are elevated into legally enforceable rights, so that
if a law infringes on these moral rights, the law is not valid.' 0
right to privacy, and the eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Nevertheless, the district court found no constitutional bar to the criminalization of
homosexual conduct.
6. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
9. See my earlier analysis to this effect. Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitu-
tional Right to Privacy .A Moral Theory, 45 FORD. L. REV. 1281 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
UnnaturalActs]. The present essay develops the themes of my earlier analysis in the context
of a deeper analysis of the constitutional right to privacy.
10. See D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAw 39-56 (1977).
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Ronald Dworkin has recently described these structural features in
terms of his rights thesis, "l which rests on an analytical claim regarding
the force of rights as trump cards that, by definition, outweigh utilita-
rian or quasi-utilitarian considerations and can legitimately only be
weighed against other rights. Moreover, the weighing of rights cannot
be a sham appeal to vague and speculative consequences. Finally, the
force of the rights thesis in American constitutional law is shown by the
fact that violation of constitutional rights establishes not merely a per-
mission but an affirmative right and even a duty to disobey the chal-
lenged law. This principle derives from the force of the case or
controversy requirement for federal litigation,12 which typically re-
quires that people have standing to make constitutional arguments
about violation of human rights only when they have disobeyed the law
in question and are about to be prosecuted for violations thereof.13 Ac-
cordingly, the vindication and elaboration of constitutional rights re-
quires willingness to disobey the law on a suitable occasion.
Dworkin's description of the institutionalization of the rights thesis
in American constitutional law directly challenges current constitu-
tional theories that do not take seriously the rights thesis and the conse-
quent proper scope of the countermajoritarian judicial review that
enforces constitutional rights. These theories rest either on utilitarian-
ism,14 which became the dominant American moral jurisprudence in
the late nineteenth century with Holmes's The Common Law,15 or on
twentieth century value skepticism. 16 Neither moral view can be
11. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-90 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
DWORKIN].
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
13. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1930) (federal employees held
to have no standing where they desired to engage in political activity in violation of the
Hatch Act but did not actually do so); sf Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278
(1961) (loyalty oath).
14. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 212-13, 219-20. Dworkin fails to develop this point.
For an elaboration, see M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY (1973). Com-
pare the majoritarian appeal in Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1893), which is implicitly utilitarian. Also com-
pare the implicit utilitarianism in Bickel's later works, A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
15. See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (M. Howe ed. 1963) (originally published
1881). On its influence on American legal thought, see Richards, Taking 'Taking Rights
Seriously' Seriously." Reflections on Dworkin and the American Revival of Natural Law, 52
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1265, 1334-38 (1977).
16. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958) [hereinafter cited as HAND]. Compare
A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 174-75 (1970), in which a
value skepticism similar to Hand's leads to a critique of moral reform through constitutional
adjudication. Moral reform and reflection in the light of principles is to be replaced by
unconscious moral historicism. These ideas represent a significant retreat from Bickel's ear-
lier work. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). Value skepticism
squared with the rights thesis as it underlies American constitutional
law. Accordingly, the constitutional theories that assume or presup-
pose these viewpoints either skeptically question the very legitimacy of
judicial review" or urge that the scope of judicial review be sharply
circumscribed.' 8 The American practice of constitutional law, as
Dworkin's descriptive thesis shows, does not conform to this theory;
American judges, like Holmes and Hand, did not decide constitutional
cases in the way their theory of law would require.' 9 This dissonance
of American theory and practice indicates, I believe, not a defect in the
practice of American constitutional law, which rests on sound moral
foundations, but a focal inadequacy in American legal theory that has
not, in a memorable phrase of Dworkin's, taken rights seriously.
In order to understand and interpret the constitutional design, we
must take seriously the radical vision of human rights that the Consti-
tution was intended to express and in terms of which the written text of
the Constitution was intended to be interpreted; this author calls this
vision the unwritten constitution. 20 The idea of human rights was a
major departure in civilized moral thought. When Locke, Rousseau,
and Kant progressively gave the idea of human rights its most articu-
late and profound theoretical statement, they defined a way of thinking
and utilitarianism are often inextricably related by these theorists. The idea, invoked by
Holmes himself, appears to be one that is skeptical of any nonutilitarian ideas, but that
utilitarian ideas are to be invoked in any proper policy analysis of the law. See O.W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (M. Howe ed. 1963). For a good statement of the Holmes
value skepticism as a theory of the first amendment, see his dissent in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919).
17. See HAND, supra note 16.
18. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
19. For example, consider the famous Holmes-Brandeis dissents urging a more expan-
sive vindication of first amendment rights. See Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920);
Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919). Holmes bottoms this view on value skepticism expressed in the form that the value
of controverted ideas is to be judged by the capacity of such beliefs to win the battle for
men's minds on the fair terms insured by the first amendment requirement that the state be a
neutral observer. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). But, the argument that the first amendment is thus necessary to advance truth is
not the best argument to support the result Holmes and Brandeis correctly wanted. The
search for truth might be secured by much less expansive constitutional guarantees than
Holmes and Brandeis urged. For example, the first amendment could have been limited to
certain kinds of educated elites or confined to certain limited categories of communication.
This shows not that the recommended expansionist interpretation of the first amendment is
wrong, but that Holmes' theory of justification is inadequate to his moral aims. For an
attempt to formulate a more adequate account, see Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity
Law. Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974). For a
more extended critique of legal realism along these lines, see Richards, Book Review, 24
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 310 (1978).
20. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
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about the moral implications of human personality that was radically
new. The practical political implications of this way of thinking are a
matter of history. The idea of human rights was among the central
moral concepts in terms of which a number of great political revolu-
tions conceived and justified their demands.21 Once introduced, the
idea of human rights could not be confined. In this country it provided
the foundation for the distinctly American innovation of judicial re-
view-the idea that an enforceable charter of human rights requires a
special set of governing institutions that, in principle, protect these
rights from incursions of the governing majority.22 Thus, there is little
question that the Bill of Rights was part of and gave expression to a
developing moral theory regarding the rights of individuals that had
been theoretically stated by Milton23 and Locke24 and that was given
expression by Rousseau 25 and Kant.26 The founding fathers believed
some such theory27 and regarded the Bill of Rights, inter alia, as a way
21. The political revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed
such landmarks as the English Petition of Rights (1627), the Habeas Corpus Act (1679), the
American Declaration of Independence (1776), the United States Constitution (1787), the
American Bill of Rights (1791), and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citi-
zen (1789).
22. Although the idea of judicial review is American in origin, it did have European
antecedents. See Cappelletti & Adams, Judicial Review of Legislation: European Antecedents
and Adaptations, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1207 (1966). The current American form of judicial
review is striking in that it is tied to the function of ordinary litigation regarding private
rights, whereas judicial review in other countries, which followed the American example in
generally adopting the institution, is not tied to private litigation in this way. See Kauper,
The Supreme Court: Hybrid Organ of State, 21 Sw. L.J. 573, 574-76, 590 (1967). For descrip-
tions of non-American models, see M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPO-
RARY WORLD 45-68 (1971). See also Rosenn, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 1411, 1417-20
(1972).
23. See J. MILTON, Areopagitica, in AREOPAGITICA, AND OF EDUCATION (G. Sabine
ed. 1951).
24. See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (T. Peardon ed. 1952); J.
LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LET-
TER CONCERNING TOLERATION (D. Sherman ed. 1937).
25. See J. ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DIS-
COURSES (G. Cole trans. 1930).
26. See I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J. Ladd trans. 1965); I.
KANT, Concerning the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, But Does Not Apply in
Practice, in SOCIETY, LAW, AND MORALITY 159-72 (F. Olafson ed. 1961).
27. Among the more important works that illustrate the impact of European natural
rights and general Enlightenment thought on American thought are B. BAILYN, THE IDEO-
LOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); H. COMMAGER, THE EMPIRE OF
REASON: How EUROPE IMAGINED AND AMERICA REALIZED THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1977);
H. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 282-305 (1969). One important recent book debunks the
specific influence of Locke on Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence. See G.
WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 167-92
(1978). The case is probably overstated. See Morgan, The Heart ofJefferson, N.Y. REVIEW
of institutionalizing it.28 Nevertheless, attempts to define the specific
content of constitutionally protected moral rights are frustrated by the
fact that articulation of such rights typically rests on constitutional pro-
visions strikingly general in form (e.g., "freedom of speech or of the
press"; "due process of law"; "equal protection of the law") and often
lacking any convincing legal history regarding the intended application
of the provision. A consensus, to the extent one existed when these
clauses were drafted, was reached on the ambiguous generalities of po-
litical compromise.29 Even when circumstances at the time strongly
suggest a certain interpretation, such legal history has not convention-
ally been regarded as dispositive.30 In order to understand how consti-
OF BOOKS, August 17, 1978, at 38. Wills does acknowledge general Lockean influence,
WILLS, supra, at 175, but his main emphasis is on the specific influence of Scottish moral
sense theorists, in particular Hutcheson, on Jefferson. Id. at 167-255. The emphasis of these
theorists on a fundamental moral equality based on the equal moral sense of all persons, id.
at 207-17, clearly prefigures Kantian ideas of the equality of all persons in respect of the
Moral Law. See note 42 infra. Jefferson clearly accepted ideas of fundamental moral equal-
ity and clearly believed in forms of natural rights. See WILLS, supra, at 229-39. Wills'
argument is not against Jefferson's belief in natural rights, but against a certain interpreta-
tion of his beliefs in the content of those rights, i.e., the primacy of property.
28. Of course, morally informed constitutional provisions have not always been ap-
plied uniformly and consistently with their underlying moral principles. For example, the
first amendment clearly rests on the substantive moral idea that all men have certain inalien-
able rights, including freedom of speech and rights of religious tolerance. The Constitution
did not consistently extend these basic rights to all persons, however. For example, the
institution of slavery was nowhere condemned, but was rather impliedly endorsed by three
clauses in the Constitution that refer to slavery in a way which contemplates the continued
existence of that institution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. IV, § 2, cl.
3. This flaw in the constitutional charter of basic moral rights was resolved only by the Civil
War and the constitutional amendments which followed in its wake. Of these amendments,
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment have been espe-
cially fertile sources for the enlargement of constitutional rights. The equal protection
clause, for example, has been interpreted to require forms of equal protection well beyond
the original intent to abolish slavery and concomitant state practices. For an excellent ac-
count of this development, see Developments in the La--Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 1065 (1969). The due process clause has been interpreted to require not only applica-
tion to the states of many of the original amendments comprising the Bill of Rights, but has
also been viewed as a means of protecting basic liberties not expressly articulated in the Bill
of Rights, including, as we shall see, the constitutional right to privacy. See, e.g., Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married couples to use contraceptives); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate a child in a school of the parents'
choice); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right of a child to study a foreign
language).
29. For example, the legal history of free speech in England and America prior to the
adoption of the first amendment renders doubtful any consensus on the specific application
of the amendment. Seegenerally L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION; FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960).
30. Consider the following examples. First, the adopters of the fourteenth amendment
quite clearly did not contemplate that the amendment would abolish segregation. See Bick-
el, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
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tutional provisions of these kinds are interpreted, we must advert to the
underlying concepts of human rights that they express.
Often, in order to articulate a hermeneutics of the meanings that
language properly bears, we invoke an underlying theory of the kind of
communication that a specific form of discourse exemplifies.3 1 When a
critic of the arts, for example, interprets the meaning of a complex work
of art, he or she invokes, inter alia, conventions of communication of
the genre in question because such conventions were part of the as-
sumed and well-understood background of shared communicative un-
derstandings that the artist invoked in creating the work.32 In the law,
the canons of statutory interpretation importantly attempt to specify an
underlying theory of the proper communicative purposes that may rea-
sonably be imputed to the choice of legislative language in the context
of constitutional values and the institutional separation of powers.
33
Correspondingly, the meaning of constitutional provisions necessarily
rests on the background theory of human values that the Constitution
assumes as its communicative context.
When referring, then, to the concept of human rights as the un-
written constitution, the author does not mean to suggest that these un-
derlying understandings are in some sense a secret and impalpable
mist.34 On the contrary, the idea of human rights is the necessary her-
meneutical principle that alone enables us to understand how it is that
Yet, the Court in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954), expressly put such
history aside in reaching its decision. Second, the existence, at the time of the adoption of
the first amendment, of laws such as those against seditious libel has never been supposed to
conclude the question of the constitutionality of such laws. For a discussion of the crime of
seditious libel at common law, see L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION; FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960). For the view that seditious libel was
abolished by the first amendment, see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 272 (1952)
(Black, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1941); Grosjean v. Ameri-
can Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248-49 (1936) (first amendment prohibits taxes that restrict
newspaper circulation, although such taxes were employed in England and America at the
time of that amendment's adoption).
31. Even with respect to ordinary word meanings, dictionaries are often only the start-
ing place for inquiries into meaning. Sometimes, historical accounts are useful supplements.
See, e.g., C.S. LEwis, STUDIES IN WORDS (1960). In others, we seek deeper philosophical
analysis in order to afford an elucidating theory of the underlying concepts invoked by the
use of certain language.
32. See, e.g., E. PANOFSKY, MEANING IN THE VISUAL ARTS (1955).
33. See generally, H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Mak-
ing and Application of Law 1144-416 (1958) (mimeographed materials published by
Harvard Law School).
34. The famous legal positivist appeal to "wash the law in cynical acid" derives from
O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167-202 (1952). Com-
pare Holmes' derogatory reference to viewing the common law as "a brooding
omniprescence in the sky" rather than as "the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi
sovereign that can be identified." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917)
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constitutional provisions have any meaning at all. Indeed, alternative,
legal-realist constitutional theories are notoriously inadequate in that
they fail to take seriously the kinds of normative meaning that constitu-
tional provisions conventionally and often unambiguously express.
That the interpretation of constitutional meaning should invoke back-
ground communicative understandings is inprincpile no more mysteri-
ous than the fact of human linguistic communication. 35
Accordingly, since the central task of a constitutional theory is to
explicate the background understandings that constitutional language
invokes, we must take as our central analytical focus the unwritten con-
stitution, the idea of human rights. So far we have only described the
form of the rights thesis in constitutional law. Now, we must ask the
deeper philosophical question: what is the underlying structure of val-
ues that justifies the rights thesis-that rights trump utilitarian consid-
erations, that rights may be weighed only against rights, and that rights
justify, in extremis, forms of ultimate disobedience.
Autonomy and Equality as the Values Underlying the Concept
of Human Rights
To think of persons as having human rights is to commit oneself to
a way of thinking about them premised on two crucial assumptions:
first, that persons have the capacity to be autonomous in living their
life; second, that persons are entitled, as persons, to equal concern and
respect in exercising their capacities for living autonomously. When
these assumptions are accepted, so too is the rights thesis. Let us begin
with an explication of these concepts, and then we may clarify how
they underlie and justify the rights thesis.
Autonomy, in the sense fundamental to the theory of human
rights, is an empirical assumption that persons as such have a range of
capacities that enables them to develop, and act upon plans of action
(Holmes, J., dissenting). For the application of these ideas to constitutional law, see HAND,
supra note 16, at 1-3, 33-34.
35. The question of the philosophical status of meaning in constitutional interpretation
has recently been strikingly raised in Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It
Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977). The authors equate constitutional mean-
ing with utterer's meaning, so that constitutional meaning changes as the utterer's meaning
(here, Supreme Court interpretation) changes. But even utterer's meaning typically depends
on the background conventions that speakers of a language assume, so that analysis of even
utterer's meaning often requires analysis of these background conventions. See S. SCHIF-
FER, MEANING 118-66 (1972). Meaning in constitutional interpretation, which of course
expresses a complex legal institution, correspondingly requires analysis of these background
conventions that are much more stable than Munzer and Nickel suppose. Dworkin's dis-
tinction between concepts and conventions expresses this important truth, namely, that the
stability of constitutional meaning rests on quite general concepts which are valid over time.
See DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 136.
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that take as their object one's life and the way it is lived.
36
The consequence of these capacities of autonomy is that humans
can make independent decisions regarding what their life shall be, self-
critically reflecting, as a separate being, which of one's first-order
desires will be developed and which disowned, which capacities culti-
vated and which left barren, with whom one will or will not identify, or
what one will define and pursue as needs and aspirations. In brief,
autonomy gives to persons the capacity to call their life their own. The
development of these capacities for separation and individuation is,
from birth, the central developmental task of becoming a person.
37
36. Sometimes, the exercise of such capacities of autonomy is rational or morally desir-
able, in other instances irrational or morally wrong. Human beings, in thinking about their
own lives, are notoriously subject to tragic self-deception and blindness. But, it is autonomy
that gives persons, uniquely, the capacity for finding tragic waste so profoundly meaningful.
In educating the exercise of autonomy against tragic mistakes, humans call upon complex
capacities for language and self-consciousness, memory, logical relations, empirical reason-
ing about beliefs and their validity (human intelligence), and the capacity to use normative
principles in terms of which plans of action can be assessed.
Harry Frankfurt made this point when he argued that the "essential difference between
persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will." Frankfurt,
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 THE J. OF PHILOSOPHY, Jan. 14, 1971, at
6. For a related account, see G. Dworkin, Autonomy and Behavior Control, 6 HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Feb. 1976, at 23-28; G. Dworkin, Acting Free,, Nous 4, no. 4 (1970). Frank-
furt correctly argues that contemporary discussions of personal identity are not properly
discussions of the concept of a person at all, for many animals of lower species can have
both predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics and states of consciousness whose unity is
the problem of personal identity. Such animals are not, however, persons. The difference
between persons, who happen also to be humans, and animals is, Frankfurt argues, neither
the capacity to have desires or motives, nor the capacity to deliberate and make decisions
based on prior thought, for certain lower animals may have these properties. Rather, be-
sides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, persons, as such, also may
want to have or not to have certain desires. As Frankfurt put it, persons "are capable of
wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many ani-
mals appear to have the capacity for. . . 'first-order desires' or 'desires of the first order,'
which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man,
however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the
formation of second-order desires." Frankfurt, supra, at 7.
The second-order desires and plans of action, which constitute autonomy, mark the
capacity of a person, as such, to develop, to want to act on, and to act on plans of action
which take as their object changes in the way one lives one's life. For example, persons
establish various kinds of priorities and schedules for the satisfaction of first-order desires.
The satisfaction of certain wants (for example, hunger) is regular, the satisfaction of others is
sometimes postponed (for example, delays in sexual gratification in order to develop and
educate certain competences). Indeed, persons sometimes gradually eliminate certain self-
criticized desires (smoking) or over time encourage the development of others (cultivating
one's still undeveloped capacities for love and tender mutual response). On the relation of
the notion of a person to rational choice, including choices of these kinds, see D. RICHARDS,
A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 27-47 (1971). For an attempt to explicate the notion of
a person comparable to Frankfurt's process, see id. at 65-68.
37. See M. MAHLER, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BIRTH OF THE HUMAN INFANT: SYMBIOSIS
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Autonomy, as a theory of the competences of persons as such,38
had a relatively late development. The idea, probably first suggested in
the late Middle Ages39 and emerging into secular political practice in
the English Civil War,40 flowered into a self-consciously powerful po-
litical and social idea in the works of Rousseau 41 and Kant.42 The
thinkers and artists of ancient Greece, or at least the ones whose works
remain extant, apparently lacked the concept at least in the form of a
conception of the capacities of persons, as such .43 Correlatively, the
Greeks lacked the idea that people, in view of their capacity for auton-
omy, are entitled to equal concern and respect, as persons. As a corol-
lary, Greek political theory does not invoke the language and thought
AND INDIVIDUATION (1975); L. KAPLAN, ONENESS AND SEPARATENESS: FROM INFANT TO
INDIVIDUAL (1978).
38. The idea of autonomy is confirmed by the data and theoretical structure of ego
psychology, which has developed Freud's late theory of the independent power of the ego
into a well-evidenced theory of ego autonomy focusing on the capacities of persons, as such,
to develop and pursue independent adaptive capacities of reality testing in a conflict free
zone. Freud's conception of the ego was classically formulated in S. FREUD, The Ego and the
Id, in 19 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 87 (Standard ed.
1923). In this essay, the ego appears as the passive mediator between id and superego im-
pulses. This passive battleground ego conception was expressly disapproved by Freud in his
important later work, Inhibitions, Symptoms andAnxiety, in 20 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 87-172 (Standard ed. 1926), wherein he seeks to charac-
terize the independent power of the ego to deal with internal and external dangers (both
realistic and intra-psychic id and superego impulses) by triggering the protective system of
defenses. Freud's theory of the defenses was elaborated by Anna Freud. See A. FREUD,
THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE (1936). Later ego psychology has sought to
characterize further the reality functions of the ego in addition to its unconscious defensive
mechanisms, on which Freud focused. Heinz Hartmann developed accordingly his concep-
tion of ego autonomy, focusing on the capacities of the person to engage in adaptive reality
testing in a conflict free zone, ie., a zone free of the warring id and superego impulses. See
H. HARTMANN, EGO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF ADAPTATION (D. Rapaport trans.
1958). In light of the subsequent work of Piaget, Erikson, and studies of animal and child
behavior, these notions of ego functions have been developed into a theory of the competent
exercise of the capacities of persons as such with independent desires to exercise these capac-
ities competently. See R. WHITE, EGO AND REALITY IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY (1963).
39. William of Ockham appears to be the crucial figure. He develops a radical theory
of free will and nominalism (suggestive of autonomy) as the predicate of ideas of inalienable
human rights. See 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 315-17 (P. Edwards ed. 1957).
40. For a remarkable collection of political tracts from this period which crucially in-
voke these ideas, see PURITANISM AND LIBERTY; BEING THE ARMY DEBATES (1647-9) FROM
THE CLARKE MANUSCRIPTS (A. Woodhouse ed. 1974).
41. See J. ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND Dis-
COURSES (G. Cole trans. 1930). See also J. Rousseau, EMILE, (B. Foxley trans. 1961). On
the profound connection between Rousseau and Kant, see E. CASSIRER, THE QUESTION OF
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, (P. Gay trans. 1963).
42. See, I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (L. Beck trans.
1959); I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J. Ladd trans. 1965); I. KANT,
THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE (J. Ellington trans. 1964).
43. See A. ADKINS, FROM THE MANY TO THE ONE (1970).
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of human rights.44
When the notions of autonomy and equal concern and respect ap-
pear as powerful political and social ideas in Rousseau and Kant, it is
thus a radical repudiation of the vision of the platonic therapeutic
state.45 This repudiation was based on an alternative conception of or-
dinary human competence, summarized in Kant's moving description
of persons as sovereign in the kingdom of ends,4 6 namely, as capable of
deciding what their ends shall be. The primary consequence of Kant's
conception is the idea of human rights, the idea of intrinsic limits on
the degree to which one person may control the life of another even for
putatively benevolent motives. Persons are now conceived as having a
unique capacity, and thus authority, to decide on the form of their
lives. Accordingly, the idea of legitimate paternalistic concern among
mature, reasonable adults is now subject to moral constraints that were,
for Plato and Aristotle, unthinkable. When Freud developed a thera-
peutic method intended to deepen our capacities for autonomy, he nat-
urally insisted, consistent with the moral vision of autonomy, that the
free assent of the patient was the only acceptable or legitimate criterion
44. In saying that Plato or Aristotle lacks the concept of autonomy as a capacity of
persons, as such, and the correlative idea of equal concern and respect, one does not, pari
passu, claim that they lacked the concept of personal identity, nor that they did not signifi-
cantly foreshadow the concept of autonomy that was later to develop. For example, one of
Plato's seminal contributions to philosophical psychology was to formulate and explicate in
The Republic a conception of the capacity of the philosophical soul for rational self-rule
which is the first philosophical description anywhere of what is here called autonomy. How-
ever, crucially, Plato views autonomy as a capacity only of a very few, gifted people who,
alone having the capacity for self-rule, are the only legitimate rulers of others; Plato, as
Greek thought in general, lacks the idea, fundamental to the idea of human rights, that
autonomy is a capacity of all persons, as such.
What Plato and Aristotle lacked was not a coherent idea of personal identity, nor the
idea that some people have the capacities herein described as autonomy, but the idea that
persons, as such, have these capacities and, therefore, are entitled to equal concern and
respect. It was, I believe, the common sense of ancient Greece, which Plato and Aristotle
understandably shared, that persons as such do not have what contemporary ego psychology
denominates a developed ego, ie., the executive capacity to formulate an integrated plan of
life and pursue it as a separate person. The general view of personal competence of the
ancient Greeks suggests the fragmented ego, the "divided self--generally passive, with ap-
petites, emotions, and intellect isolated as independent agencies on the battleground of the
body, unintegrated by any coherent, higher-order planner within the self.
The fundamental Greek vision is that of Plato's Republic: the ruler, a benevolent physi-
cian who alone understands the health of the balanced human organism, and who may
literally do anything to realize this desirable health which most humans cannot realize on
their own. Such benevolent intentions could have, Plato and Aristotle supposed, no limits;
for, given the ideal of personal health which only the physician-ruler incarnates and the
radical lack of autonomy of most humans, how could there be limits in effectuating the only
good that there was or could be?
45. See note 44 supra.
46. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (L. Beck trans.
1959).
for the validity of the therapist's analytical efforts. 47 Since persons
have a unique capacity to understand and change their lives, Freud
ruled out ab initio the Platonic forms of intrusive control, for only the
person can have the final say in unravelling the mysteries of the self.
Freud, like Rousseau and Kant, thus places the integrity of the self at
the core of social theory.
The sense of equality underlying the idea of equal concern and
respect is one of fundamental moral equality, which Kant expressed by
the idea of equality in the kingdom of ends. To attribute human rights
to persons is to assess and criticize human institutions and relationships
in terms of whether those institutions and relationships conform to
principles of obligation and duty48 that guarantee to each person equal
concern and respect in exercising what is here called autonomy.49 The
vision, at the last, is one of people who, because of autonomous choice,
are able to identify their lives as their own, having been afforded to the
greatest extent feasible the inestimable moral and human good of
choosing their own lives as free and rational beings.50 Effective auton-
omy in this sense may, of course, be perversely abused; it is surely com-
patible with shaping personality and character structures that are
undesirable in myriad ways. But for human creatures, autonomy is the
sine qua non of exercising capacities of the rational choice of one's life
in terms of which we define our notions of the good.51 Accordingly, the
revolution in human thought represented by the rights thesis derives
not from actual autonomy but from equal concern and respect for the
capacity for autonomy.
Perhaps nothing can ensure effective autonomy. The process of
achieving it is often painful, and the process of maintaining it never
completely secure. The rights thesis, however, rests on the idea that
47. See S. FREUD, Constructions in Analysis, in 23 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL
WORDS OF SIGMUND FREUD 257-69 (Standard ed. 1937). Freud, of course, applied his ther-
apeutic methods only to neurotics who were typically, aside from neurotic symptoms, rea-
sonable and mature people. Psychotics raise different kinds of problems in terms of the
legitimacy of paternalistic interference. See D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW
216-20 (1977).
48. For an account of principles of obligation and duty, see D. RICHARDS, A THEORY
OF REASONS FOR ACTION 92-106 (1971).
49. Autonomy has often been confused with a number of theses from which it is distin-
guishable, for example, causal indeterminism, wilfuliness, egoism, and enlightenment psy-
chology. I have tried to explore these distinctions in a forthcoming article, Rights and
Autonomy" A Prolegomenon to the Theory of Rights, - HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. -
(forthcoming).
50. A similar idea underlies John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, especially chapter 3. See
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1st ed. n.p. 1859); cf. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood,
6 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 26 (1976) (the idea of moral title to one's self).
5 1. For a statement of the classic position of the good as the object of rational choice,
with supporting references to the classical literature, see D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REA-
SONS FOR ACTION 286-90 (1971).
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viewing people in this way and regulating our conduct accordingly can
facilitate the moving Kantian vision referred to earlier, of persons as
equal and autonomous in the kingdom of ends with servility and non-
consensual dependence reduced to a tolerable minimum.
52
Intuitively, people often speak and think of a denial of human
rights as a kind of affront to human dignity, a form of disrespect.5 3 The
present explication of the rights thesis affords rational foundation for
this view. If the idea that people have human rights rests on equal
concern and respect for their autonomy, to deny them their rights ex-
presses disrespect or contempt for their capacity for autonomy. Thus,
the denial of rights has traditionally been justified on the ground that
the persons in question are a kind of permanent child or semi-child, a
status which justifies forms of paternalistic interference that would
otherwise be improper. The apologists for the enslavement of blacks
and the subjection of women standardly invoked such arguments.
54
The advance of the rights thesis has rested on the repudiation of these
arguments, which we now perceive as resting on an unjustified con-
tempt that prevented the realization of the capacity of those suppressed.
Finally, the moral values of autonomy and equal concern and re-
spect explain and justify the distinguishing features of the rights thesis.
To see people as having the capacity for autonomy and entitled to
equal concern and respect in exercising their autonomy is to deny the
propriety of allowing utilitarian calculations to override the range of
significant life choices facilitated by the rights thesis, and to require
that considerations of rights be weighed only against considerations of
rights of comparable weight.
The nature of rights as trumps over utilitarian considerations en-
sures that persons are afforded conditions favorable to the exercise of
autonomy with security from utilitarian manipulations, and that these
52. It is no accident that the progressive enlargement of the rights thesis, since Rous-
seau and Kant, has rested on an enlarged conception of the class of humans believed to have
autonomous capacities, for example, blacks and women. When John Stuart Mill eloquently
argued against the subjection of women, he accepted, arguendo, that the women of his pe-
riod were not actually autonomous. See generally J.S. MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN
(Ist ed. n.p. 1869). Mill's arguments for women's rights rested not on their actual condition,
which he conceded to be in large part slavishly dependent on and vicariously experienced
through men, but on their capacities for autonomy. Likewise, the vindication of the human
rights of putatively primitive people typically does not rest on the idea that such people are
effectively autonomous but rather is based upon the assumption that these people have the
capacity for autonomy. I take it to be an analytically distinct question whether the content
of human rights varies as applied to the conditions of a primitive society. In my view, it
clearly does.
53. Cf. J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, ch. 6 (1973).
54. See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1073 (2d ed. 1962); J. HALLER & R.
HALLER, THE PHYSICIAN AND SEXUALITY IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 48-61 (1974); Fitzhugh,
Sociologyfor the South, in SLAVERY DEFENDED 34 (E.L. McKitrick ed. 1963).
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conditions may be compromised only in view of considerations of
rights that better facilitate the underlying values of equal concern and
respect for autonomy.
The idea of human rights as minimum boundary conditions ex-
plains the last feature of the rights thesis, the use of the language and
thought of rights in revolution, rebellion, and ultimate resistance.
Human rights are defined by ethical principles of obligation and duty
expressive of the values of autonomy and equal concern and respect.
One of the cardinal tasks of a complete theory of rights would be to
discuss the various kinds of coercion which may be used to effectuate
human rights (for example, economic boycotts, political pressures, in-
formal criticism, forms of military action, and the like). 5 We can, for
present purposes, say at least this: the term "human rights" in our
moral vocabulary connotes a concept that defines minimum moral de-
cency. Accordingly, failure to support these rights is often appropri-
ately regarded as intolerable, and the vindication of these rights is often
the proper ground of ultimate and intransigent resistance.
Because autonomy and equal concern and respect are the focal
values in terms of which constitutional rights are and ought to be inter-
preted, it is quite natural that the recent revival of contractarian theory,
through the work of John Rawls, 56 has been regarded of seminal im-
portance in understanding constitutional values in a way in which the
existing moral theories of constitutional theorists, utilitarianism and
value skepticism, cannot imitate. The great early theorists of human
rights-Locke, Rousseau, and Kant-whose ideas clearly influenced
American constitutionalism, all invoke, explicitly or implicitly, 57 con-
tractarian metaphors in explaining the concrete implications of auton-
omy and equal concern and respect.
The basic analytic model is this:58 Moral principles are those that
rational persons would agree are the ultimate standards of conduct ap-
plicable at large. In this context "rational person" refers to one in a
hypothetical "original position" of equal liberty who has all knowledge
and reasonable belief except for being ignorant of the specific personal
situation.
Since Rawls's concern is to apply this definition of moral princi-
ples to a theory of justice, he introduces into the original position the
55. See D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 137-41 for some specific
consideration of this question. See also M. WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977).
56. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter cited as RAWLS).
57. Kant did not expressly invoke a contractarian model in the way Locke, see note 24
supra, and Rousseau, see note 25 supra, did, but he clearly suggested it. See I. KANT, Con-
cerning the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, But Does Not Apply in Practice, in
SOCIETY, LAW, AND MORALITY 159 (F. Olafson ed. 1961).
58. RAWLS, supra note 56, at 11-22. See also D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS
FOR ACTION 75-91 (1971).
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existence of conflicting claims to a limited supply of general goods and
considers a specific set of principles to regulate these claims.5 9 "Gen-
eral goods" are those things or conditions that would most universally
be chosen should one have the opportunity. 60 Liberty, understood as
the absence of constraint, is usually classified as one of these general
goods. Similarly, it is natural to identify capacities, opportunities and
wealth as general goods.61 Rational people in the original position
have no way of predicting the probability that they will end up in any
given situation in life. If a person agrees to principles of justice that
permit deprivations of liberty and property rights and later discovers
that he occupies a disadvantaged position, he will, by definition, have
no just claim against deprivations that may render his entire life pros-
pects meagre and bitterly servile. To avoid such consequences, the ra-
tional strategy in choosing the basic principles of justice would be the
conservative "maximin" strategy;62 one would want to make certain
that the worst position in the adopted system is the best of all conceiva-
ble worst positions-that is, one would maximize the minimum condi-
tion. Thus, if a person were born into the worst possible situation of
life allowed by the adopted moral principles, he would still be better off
than he would be in the worst situation allowed by other principles.
The rational decision in the original position on such principles
requires consideration of the relative weight assigned the general goods
by those in the original position. Rawls argues that self-respect or self-
esteem occupies herein a place of special prominence. 63 People desire
general goods in order to attain self-respect through the fulfillment of
their life plan; accordingly, we may refer to self-respect as the primary
human good. People in the original position would regulate access to
the general goods so as to maximize the possibility that each member of
society will be able to attain self-respect.
Rawls's notion of self-respect, as the primary human good, is im-
portantly connected to the idea of autonomy. Self-respect is based on
59. If there were goods in abundance, or if people were more willing to sacrifice their
interests for the good of others, the need for a moral system might be nonexistent or signifi-
cantly different. For David Hume's remarkable discussion of the conditions of moderate
scarcity, see D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HuMAN NATURE 485, 495 (1st ed. London 1738).
60. Rawls describes these general goods as "things which it is supposed a rational man
wants whatever else he wants." RAWLS, supra note 56, at 92. The notion of rationality
considered here is developed in D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 27-48
(1971) and in RAWLS, supra note 56, at 407-16. The general view of the good is discussed in
RAWLS, supra note 56, at 395-452 and in RICHARDS, supra, at 286-91.
61. RAwLS, supra note 56, at 92. See also Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Fi-
nancing: Towards a Moral Theory of ConstiutionalAdudicaion, 41 U. Cm. L. Rv. 32, 41-
49 (1973).
62. See RAWLS, supra note 56, at 150-61.
63. Id. at 433, 440-46.
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one's ability to exercise native capacities competently.64 For human
beings, the relevant capacities include the ability to think and deliber-
ate, to use language, to create artifacts of a practical or aesthetic nature,
and the like-all of which are crucially employed in the capacity of
persons, exercising autonomy.65 Deprived of the experience of per-
sonal competence and self-mastery of these kinds, humans lack a sense
of self-worth, leading to the despairing inner death central to apathy,
cynicism, stoical remoteness, and spiritual slavery.
Thus, Rawls's contractarian reconstruction provides an interpreta-
tion of the moral weight of autonomy (the interpretation of autonomy
as a feature of the primary human good) and equality (the original
position of equal liberty), and affords a decision procedure (the max-
imin strategy) that provides a determinate substantive account for the
content of human rights as minimum conditions of human decency.
An important feature of the argument is the assumption of ignorance of
specific identity. Rawls believes that a fundamental feature of the idea
of political right, expressive of the values of autonomy and equal con-
cern and respect, is neutrality between and among visions of the good
life. The ignorance assumption assures such neutrality by depriving
people of any basis for distorting their decisions (illegitimately) in the
favor of their own, possibly parochial vision of the good life. The neu-
tral vision is central to the concept of privacy.
A Moral Theory of the Constitutional Right to Privacy
All discussions of the right of privacy must begin with the famous
law review article by Warren and Brandeis in which they recom-
mended the recognition of privacy as an independent legal right.66
Warren and Brandeis were immediately concerned with the failure of
existing tort law to provide a clear remedy for the public disclosure of
private facts. Nevertheless, basing their argument on the rights "of an
inviolate personality, '67 they spoke more broadly of the human need
for "some retreat from the world,"' 68 of the effect of unwarranted intru-
sion on a person's "estimate of himself and upon his feelings," 69 and of
the "general right of the individual to be let alone."'70 The latter sug-
64. See D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 257, 265-68 (1971). See
also R.W. WHITE, EGO AND REALITY IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY (1963).
65. For the notion of a lifeplan, see RAWLS, supra note 56, at 407-16; C. FRIED, AN
ANATOMY OF VALUES 105-15 (1970); D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION
27-48, 63-74 (1971).
66. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
67. Id. at 205.
68. Id. at 196.
69. Id. at 197.
70. Id. at 205.
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gestion that the right of privacy is broader than the tort remedies under
immediate examination was confirmed by the famous dissent in Oln-
stead v. United States7 in which Brandeis invoked "the right to be let
alone" not in support of a private tort remedy but in support of an
expanded interpretation of fourth amendment constitutional rights of
private parties against the state.
72
Of course, we now perceive the interests of privacy torts and fourth
amendment guarantees as analytically similar-rights of information
control protected in the one case against individuals, in the other
against the state.73 But, the spirit of Brandeis' argument cuts deeper
than this analytical point on which he places no great weight. Bran-
deis, rather, is appealing to an underlying moral argument about the
71. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
72. The Brandeis view was finally accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court in Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For citation and discussion of the intervening cases on
mechanical and electronic surveillance, see J. VORENBERG, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCE-
DURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 628-45 (1975); Parker, A Definition ofPrivacy, 27 RUTGERS L.
REv. 275, 288-91 (1973).
73. As regards the law of torts, Dean Prosser in 1960 examined three hundred privacy
cases in an attempt to discover what interest was being protected. He concluded that no
single thing was common to every loss of privacy but noted four characteristics, at least one
of which was present in each case: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or
into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plain-
tif (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye;
(4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintifi's name or likeness. Pros-
ser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960). Subsequent commentary has sought to reduce
Prosser's list to one unifying theme, privacy as the capacity to control highly personal infor-
mation about oneself or one's experiences.
The connections between the tort and constitutional concepts of privacy are problem-
atic in the following way. Griswold established that married couples have a constitutional
privacy right to use contraceptives which the state may not abridge. The Court justified its
holding by the ancillary likelihood that anticontraceptive prosecutions would violate con-
ventional privacy interests (bugging the bedroom) which are protected from intrusion
against private parties by one of the privacy torts and against the state by fourth amendment
guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965). However, the constitutional right of privacy, as developed since
Griswold, cannot be characterized as merely a right protecting conventional privacy interests
in information control. It rests, rather, on affirmative personal rights to act in certain ways
that the state, in principle, cannot abridge. This feature of the constitutional right to privacy
cases, which commentators had observed even in Griswold, was made quite clear in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the challenged law subjected the person performing the
abortion to criminal sanctions and was held unconstitutional because it made it difficult for
women to obtain the desired service. There is not the remotest suggestion in Roe that the
state could cure the constitutional infirmity by removing any criminal sanction from the
woman while continuing effectively to restrict abortion by attacking suppliers of the service.
Indeed, since Roe, the Court has insisted that the Roe-defined right extends to "the doctor's
office, the hospital, the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to inti-
macy involved." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973). In short, there
is no evidence that the constitution right to privacy depends on outrageous government sur-
veillance violative of conventional right-to-privacy interests.
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place of human rights in the American contractarian conception of the
relation of individuals among themselves and to the state. In his
Olmstead dissent, for example, he notes:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Ameri-
cans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations.
74
When Brandeis summarized this foundational right as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,"
75
he was, I believe, invoking the general conception of human rights,
founded on autonomy and equal concern and respect. Certain of the
principles of constitutional justice upon which Brandeis relied are con-
cerned with issues having deep connection with personal dignity and
the right to control highly personal information about oneself. Such
information control is one of the primary ways in which persons au-
tonomously establish their self-conception and their varying relations
to other persons through selective information disclosure. 76 Without
some legally guaranteed right to control such information, personal au-
tonomy is degraded at its core. From personal self-definition and self-
mastery it is debased into the impersonal and fungible conventionalism
that uncontrolled publicity inevitably facilitates. 77 Accordingly, argu-
ments, premised on the foundational values of equal concern and re-
spect for autonomy, justify the protection of conventional privacy
interests under tort law, as well as under various constitutional
guarantees.
Actions protected by principles enunciated in Griswold and subse-
quent cases are denominated "private" not because they rest on infor-
mation control but because substantive constitutional principles define
conclusive reasons why they may not properly be the subject of en-
croachment by the state or by private individuals. 78 Such rights are
sensibly called "rights to privacy" in the sense that constitutional prin-
ciples debar forms of state and private regulatory or prohibitory intru-
sion into the relevant areas of people's lives: on the basis of these
principles, interference in these areas is unwarranted.
74. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
75. Id.
76. See C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 137-52 (1970).
77. See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,
39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 1003 (1964).
78. I have expanded this thought into a general theory of the public morality as the
justification for criminal penalties. See Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Per-
son:. A Moral Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution,- U. PA. L. REV.-
(forthcoming).
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What is at stake here is nothing less than the basic moral vision of
persons as having human rights: that is, as autonomous and entitled to
equal concern and respect. This vision, correctly invoked by Warren
and Brandeis in developing rights to information control, similarly un-
derlies the constitutional right to privacy. In order to explain with care
how this is so, the Article now turns to a deeper examination of the
content of the moral principles involved in this latter right, and how
they express the underlying values of autonomy and equal concern and
respect to which Brandeis appeals. This examination will show why
the constitutional right to privacy is a natural and defensible develop-
ment rooted in the unwritten constitution which gives sense to the con-
stitutional design.
The Concept of Morality and the Transvaluation of Values
The constitutional right of privacy cases typically arise in areas
where there is a strong conventional wisdom that certain conduct is
morally wrong and where the justice of that wisdom is under funda-
mental attack. It is no accident that the right of privacy is conceived by
its proponents not merely as an advisable or charitable or even wise
thing to concede, but as a right.79 Proponents conceive matters involv-
ing rights, not as human weaknesses or excusable defects that others
should benevolently overlook, but as positive moral goods that one
may demand and enforce as one's due. Accordingly, the constitutional
right to privacy is, in part, to be understood in terms of a transvaluation
of values: certain areas of conduct, traditionally conceived as morally
wrong and thus the proper object of public regulation and prohibition,
are now perceived as affirmative goods the pursuit of which does not
raise serious moral questions and thus is no longer a proper object of
public critical concern.80
79. See generaly Wasserstrom, Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination, 61 J.
PHILOSOPHY 628 (1964).
80. When Nietzsche formulated and celebrated the idea of a transvaluation of values,
he gave the idea an unwarrantably extreme interpretation by changing the underlying con-
cept of morality from a universalistic concept that embodies equal concern and respect to a
perfectionist morality which maximizes the only ultimate moral good-the excellences of
military virtue, artistic and intellectual achievements, and the like. For the main works, see
F. NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE (H.
Zimmern trans. 1909); F. NIETZSCHE, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS (1889), reprinted in THE
PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 465 (W. Kaufmann trans. 1954); F. NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARA-
THUSTRA, reprinted in id. at 121; F. NIETZSCHE, THE ANTICHRIST, reprinted in id. at 568.
Undoubtedly there have been changes of values at this foundational level. One example is
the change from Aristotelian perfectionism, which Nietzsche attempts to reintroduce, to
Kantian ethics of mutual respect. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 10 (M. Ost-
wald trans. 1962) (shows the special weight Aristotle gave to the excellence of theoretical
wisdom); I. Kant, works cited supra note 42; F. NIETZSCHE, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS, supra,
at 534. However, the transvaluation of values, relevant to the understanding andjustifiabil-
How, philosophically, are we to interpret and understand such
changes? First, as used here to explain the constitutional right to pri-
vacy, transvaluation of values refers to changes in the lower-order rules
and conventions, namely, in the light of contemporary evidence and
conditions, certain lower-order conventions are no longer justified by
ultimate moral considerations. For example, according to one influen-
tial model, sex is only proper for the purpose of procreation." 1 Many
would argue, however, that the distinctive force of human, as opposed
to animal, sexuality is that it is not rigidly procreational. To the extent
that the traditional model of sexuality is discarded in favor of a non-
procreational model, rigid moral rules prohibiting forms of non-
procreational sex are no longer perceived as justified by ultimate moral
considerations.
In order to provide reasonable criteria to assess the justifiability of
such shifts, we must return to our discussion of the foundations of con-
stitutional morality. As we saw, autonomy and equal concern and re-
spect justify the constitutional immunity of human rights from political
bargaining. Since one crucial ground for political bargaining is public
morality, constitutional values require that the content of the public
morality must be squared with the underlying values of constitutional
morality. The primacy of the free exercise and establishment of reli-
gion clauses shows that at the core of constitutional values is religious
toleration, understood as neutrality between those visions of the good
life that are fundamental to autonomous capacities. Conceptually, con-
tractarians give expression to this moral value by the ignorance as-
sumption which deprives the contractors of any basis for keying the
choice of ultimate principles to their possibly parochial vision of the
good life. These values of constitutional morality ineluctably put de-
terminate constraints on the content of the public morality which is the
foundation of the criminal law and the enforcement of which pervades
the entire legal system.
8 2
What is the constitutionally permissible content of the legal en-
forcement of morals? Regarding this question, recent moral philoso-
phy has been increasingly occupied with the clarification of the
conceptual structure of ordinary moral reasoning. 83 The concept of
ity of the constitutional right to privacy, does not describe such a foundational shift in the
concept of morality itself, but rather it does so with reference to the lower order conventions
that the concept of morality justifies. See text accompanying note 115 infra.
81. See notes 92-104 & accompanying text infra.
82. For support for this kind of position from constitutional history, see Perry, Abor-
tion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power- The Ethical Function of Substantive Due
Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976).
83. See K. BAlER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW 187-213 (1958); A. DONAGAN, THE
THEORY OF MORALITY 210-43 (1978); C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 7-29 (1978); D.
GAUTHIER, PRACTICAL REASONING (1963); B. GERT, THE MORAL RULES 60-75 (1973); A.
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morality or ethics is not an openly flexible one; there are certain deter-
minate constraints on the kind of beliefs that can be counted as ethical
in nature.8 4 Some examples of these constraints are the principles of
mutual respect-treating others as you would like to be treated in com-
parable circumstances;8 5 universalization-judging the morality of
principles by the consequences of their universal application; 6 and
minimization of fortuitous human differences (like clan, caste, ethnici-
ty, gender, and color) as a basis for differential treatment.87 It follows
from this conception that a view is not a moral one merely because it is
passionately and sincerely held, or because it has a certain emotional
depth,88 or because it is the view of one's father or mother or clan, or
because it is conventional. On the contrary, the moral point of view
affords an impartial way of assessing whether any of these beliefs,
which may often press one to action, is in fact worthy of ethical
commitment.
8 9
In similar ways and for similar reasons, not everything invoked by
democratic majorities as justified by "public morality" is, in fact, mor-
ally justified. From the moral point of view, we must always assess
such claims by whether they can be sustained by the underlying struc-
ture of moral reasoning-by principles of mutual respect, universaliza-
tion, and minimization of fortuity. In this regard, constitutional
morality is at one with the moral point of view. The values of equal
concern and respect for personal autonomy, that we have unearthed at
GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 129-98 (1978); G. GRICE, THE GROUNDS OF MORAL
JUDGMENT 1-35 (1967); R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1952); R.M. HARE,
FREEDOM AND REASON 86-185 (1963); J. MACKIE, ETHICS 83-102 (1977); J. RAWLS, A THE-
ORY OF JUSTICE (1971); D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION (1971).
84. See G. WARNOCK, CONTEMPORARY MORAL PHILOSOPHY 55-61 (1967); G. WAR-
NOCK, THE OBJECT OF MORALITY 35-70 (1971); Foot & Harrison, W¢hen Is a Princ69le a
Moral Princple?, 28 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 95 (1954); Foot, Moral Arguments, 67
MIND 502 (1958); Foot, Moral Beliefs, 59 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 83 (1958-59).
85. See K. BAIER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW 187-213 (1958); D. GAUTHIER, PRACTI-
CAL REASONING 81-94 (1963); G. GRICE, THE GROUNDS OF MORAL JUDGMENT 1-35 (1967);
J. MACKIE, ETHICS 83-102 (1977); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 130-32 (1971); D. RICH-
ARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 75-91 (1971).
86. See R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 91-94 (1963); D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF
REASONS FOR ACTION 83-85, 216 (1971).
87. This idea is the basis of Kant's theory of autonomy. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS
OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 65-71 (L. Beck trans. 1959). Also note J.S. Mill's remark
that the true idea of distributive justice consists in "redressing the inequalities and wrongs of
nature." J.S. MILL, 2 PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 398 (5th ed. 1864). Mill thus
concludes that primogeniture is unjust in that distinctions are grounded on accident. Id. at
505. Note also Sidgwick's claim that justice rewards voluntary effort, not natural ability
alone. H. SIDGWICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 505-06, 531 (1887).
88. "What is important is not the quality of the creed but the strength of the belief in
it." P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 114 (1965).
89. See authorities cited note 83 supra.
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the foundations of American constitutionalism, are the same values
that recent moral theory, following Kant,90 has identified as the funda-
mental values of the moral point of view. This kind of moral analysis
affords definite constraints on what may permissibly or justifiably be
regarded as an ethical belief.9 ' In an area where public attitudes about
public morality are, in fact, demonstrably not justified by underlying
moral constitutional principles, laws resting on such attitudes are con-
stitutionally dubious. There being no defensible moral principle to sus-
tain state interference, the matter is not a proper object of state concern.
In this soil, the constitutional right to privacy took root in Griswold.
The understanding of Griswold and its progeny begins with repu-
diation of the procreational model of sexual love which was given its
classic formulation by St. Augustine. 92 For Augustine, sexuality was a
natural object of continuing shame because it involved loss of control.
93
Accordingly, the only proper form of sex was that which was done with
the controlled intention to procreate; sexuality without procreation or
independent of such intentions was, for Augustine, intrinsically degrad-
ing.94 It follows from this view that certain rigidly defined kinds of
intercourse in conventional marriage, always with the intention to pro-
create, are alone moral; contraception, whether within or outside mar-
riage, extramarital and, of course, homosexual intercourse are
forbidden since these do not involve intent to procreate. 95
90. See A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUS-
TICE (1971); D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION (1971).
91. For example, equal concern and respect for autonomy clearly rule out as a form of
legitimate morality Aristotelian and Nietzschean perfectionism, for such moral systems
identify as the only morally relevant factors forms of elitist excellence that most persons
lack; such systems show no concern and respect for autonomous persons. See D. RICHARDS,
A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 116-17 (1971); G. WARNOCK, CONTEMPORARY MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 49-51 (1967). Similarly, we may use moral theories, for example, contractari-
anism, that express the values of autonomy and equal concern and respect. to assess which
beliefs are within the constitutionally permissible content of the public morality.
92. See AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 577-94 (H. Bettenson trans. 1972). St. Thomas
is in accord with Augustine's view. Of the emission of semen apart from procreation in
marriage, he wrote: "[Ajfter the sin of homicide whereby a human nature already in exist-
ence is destroyed, this type of sin appears to take next place, for by it the generation of
human nature is precluded." T. AQUINAS, ON THE TRUTH OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH:
SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, pt. 2, ch. 122(9), at 146 (V. Bourke trans. 1946).
93. "In fact, this lust we are now examining is something to be the more ashamed of
because the soul, when dealing with it, neither has command of itself so as to be entirely free
from lust, nor does it rule the body so completely that the organs of shame are moved by the
will instead of by lust. Indeed if they were so ruled they would not be pudenda-parts of
shame." AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 586 (H. Bettenson trans. 1972).
94. See notes 98-100 & accompanying text infra.
95. One prominent account of the Catholic view notes that Catholic canon law "holds,
as a basic and cardinal fact, that complete sexual activity and pleasure is licit and moral only
in a naturally completed act in valid marriage. All acts which, of their psychological and
physical nature, are designed to be preparatory to the complete act, take their licitness and
[Vol. 30
March 1979] SEXUAL AUTONOMY AND RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Augustine's argument rests on a rather remarkable fallacy. Au-
gustine starts with two anthropological points about human sexual ex-
perience: first, humans universally insist on having sex alone and
unobserved by others;96 and second, humans universally cover their
genitals in public. 97 Augustine argues that the only plausible explana-
tion for these two empirical facts about human sexuality is that humans
experience sex as intrinsically degrading because it involves the loss of
control;98 this perception of shame, in turn, must rest on the fact that
the only proper form of sex is having it with the controlled intention to
procreate;99 sexuality is intrinsically degrading because we tend to ex-
perience it without or independent of the one intention that alone can
validate it. l°0 Assuming, arguendo, the truth of Augustine's anthropo-
logical assumptions,' 0 l it does not follow that humans must find sex
intrinsically shameful. These facts are equally well explained by the
fact that people experience embarrassment in certain forms of publicity
of their sexuality, not shame in the experience of sex itself. Shame is
conceptually distinguishable from embarrassment in that its natural
object is a failure of personally esteemed competent self-control,
whether the failure is public or private; embarrassment, in contrast, is
their morality from the complete act. If, therefore, they are entirely divorced from the com-
plete act, they are distorted, warped, meaningless, and hence immoral." Gardiner, Moral
Principies Towards a Denition of the Obscene, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 560, 564 (1955);
c. T. BOUSCAREN, A. ELLIS, & F. KORTH, CANON LAW 930 (1963); H. GARDINER, CATHO-
LIC VIEWPOINT ON CENSORSHIP 62-67 (1958) (sanctions against immorality by lay persons).
For a critique, see R. HANEY, COMSTOCKERY IN AMERICA 88-96 (1960).
96. AuGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 579-80 (H. Bettenson trans. 1972).
97. Id. at 578-79.
98. Indeed, Augustine objects to the intensity of the experience in that it overwhelms
mental functions: "This lust assumes power not only over the whole body, and not only from
the outside, but also internally; it disturbs the whole man, when the mental emotion com-
bines and mingles with the physical craving, resulting in a pleasure surpassing all physical
delights. So intense is the pleasure that when it reaches its climax there is an almost total
extinction of mental alertness; the intellectual sentries, as it were, are overwhelmed." Id. at
577.
99. Augustine speculates that, prior to the Fall in the Garden of Eden, man could will
erections for procreation without any lust just as some extraordinary people now can wiggle
their ears at will or even pass air musically "without any stink." Id. at 588.
100. Indeed, Augustine notes that not only is sexual impulse "totally opposed to the
mind's control, it is quite often divided against itself." Id. at 577. That is, when we want to
experience such feelings, we often cannot; and when we don't want to experience them, we
do.
101. The leading anthropological study of cross-cultural sexual practices reports that,
universally, sexual intercourse occurs in private. See C. FORD & F. BEACH, PATT-ERNS OF
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 68-72 (1951) [hereinafter cited as FORD & BEACH]. This is not a charac-
teristic of animal sexual behavior. "A desire for privacy during sexual intercourse seems
confined to human beings. Male-female pairs of other animal species appear to be unaf-
fected 'by the presence of other individuals and to mate quite as readily in a crowd as when
they are alone." Id. at 71.
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experienced when a matter is made public that properly is regarded as
private. 10 2 The twin facts adduced by Augustine are, indeed, better ex-
plained by the hypothesis of embarrassment, not shame. Surely many
people experience no negative self-evaluations when they engage in sex
in private which is what the hypothesis of embarrassment, not shame,
would lead us to expect. For example, people may experience pride in
knowing that other people know or believe that they are having sex (the
recently married young couple). There is no shame here, but there
would be severe embarrassment if the sex act were actually observed.
That people would experience such embarrassment reveals something
important about human sexual experience, but it is not Augustine's
contempt for the loss of control of sexual passion. 0 3 Sexual experience
is, for human beings, a profoundly personal, spontaneous, and absorb-
ing experience in which they express intimate fantasies and vulnerabili-
ties which typically cannot brook the sense of an external, critical
observer. That humans require privacy for sex relates to the nature of
the experience; there is no suggestion that the experience is, pace Au-
gustine, intrinsically degrading.
The consequence of Augustine's fallacy is to misdescribe and mis-
identify natural features of healthy sexual experience, namely, the pri-
vacy required to express intimate sensual vulnerabilities, in terms of
putatively degraded properties of sexual experience per se. In fact, this
latter conception of sexuality relies on and expresses an overdeveloped
wilfullness that fears passion itself as a form of loss of control,'1 4 as
though humans cannot with self-esteem indulge emotional spontaneity
outside the rule of the iron procreational will. Such a conception both
underestimates the distinctly human capacity for self-control and over-
estimates the force of sexuality as a dark, unreasoning, Bacchic posses-
sion whose demands inexorably undermine the rational will. It also
fails to fit the empirical facts, indeed contradicts them. Human, as op-
posed to animal, sexuality is crucially marked by its control by higher
cortical functions and thus its involvement with the human symbolic
imagination, so that sexual propensities and experience are largely in-
dependent of the reproductive cycIe. Consequently, humans use sexu-
ality for diverse purposes-to express love, for recreation, or for
102. See D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 254 (1971).
103. See note 98 supra.
104. This very conception (that sexuality is a proper object of the will) appears to have
disastrous effects on natural sexual function. Masters and Johnson, for example, report that
a main feature of certain kinds of inadequate sexual function is the very attempt to will it.
See W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL INADEQUACY 198-99, 202-03 (1970).
This conception, thus, of certain religious traditions (namely, that "proper" sexual experi-
ence must be accompanied by certain kinds of wills and intentions) may account for the
association of defective sexual function with rigid religious sexual conceptions. See generally
id. at 10, 24, 70, 117-20, 133, 135, 139, 144, 175-76, 177-79, 189, 213, 253-56.
[Vol. 30
March 1979] SEXUAL AUTONOMY AND RIGHT TO PRIVACY 981
procreation. No one purpose necessarily dominates; rather, human
self-control chooses among the purposes depending on context and
person.
The constitutional right to privacy was developed in Griswold and
its progeny because the procreational model of sexuality could no
longer be sustained by sound empirical or conceptual argument. Lack-
ing such support, the procreational model could no longer be legally
enforced on the grounds of the "public morality," for it failed to satisfy
the postulate of constitutional morality that legally enforceable moral
ideas be grounded on equal concern and respect for autonomy and
demonstrated by facts capable of empirical validation. Accordingly,
since anticontraceptive laws are based on the concept that nonprocrea-
tional sex is unnatural, the Griswold court properly invoked the right of
privacy to invalidate the Connecticut statute. For similar reasons, laws
prohibiting the use of pornography in the home were invalidated. 0 5
Subsequently, abortion laws were also struck down because the tradi-
tional objection to them rested, in large part, on the procreational
model and the residuum of moral condemnation that was not clearly
sustained by sound argument.10 6
If the right to privacy extends to sex among unmarried couples10 7
or even to autoeroticism in the home,108 it is difficult to understand how
in a principled way the Court could decline to consider fully the appli-
cation of this right to private, consensual, deviant sex acts. The Court
might distinguish between heterosexual and homosexual forms of sex-
ual activity; but could this distinction be defended rationally? At bot-
tom, such a view must rest on the belief that homosexual or deviant sex
is unnatural. Under this view, such practices would have to be ex-
cluded altogether from the scope of the constitutional right to privacy
just as obscenity is excluded from first amendment protection. How-
ever, an analysis of the application of the notion of the "unnatural" to
deviant sexual acts and an examination of the moral force of the consti-
105. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
106. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For an examination of the Catholic response to
the Supreme Court's abortion cases, see Bresnahan, The Interaction ofReigion andLaw -A
Post- Vatican II Roman Catholic Perspective, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1361, 1377-82 (1978). For
powerful philosophical arguments against the status of the foetus as a person, see Tooley, 4
Defense ofAbortion and Infanticide, in THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION 51-91 (J. Feinberg ed.
1973); Engelhardt, Jr., The Ontology ofAbortion, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 318-34
(1976).
107. The right to privacy is clearly applicable to nonmarital contexts. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); c Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraceptives
and the unmarried); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (private use of pornography).
108. The constitutional protection for the use of pornography in the home, Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), is arguably protection for the masturbatory practices for
which the pornography may be used.
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tutional right to privacy seems to compel the clear and decisive rejec-
tion of such a view.
The use of so imprecise a notion as "unnatural" to distinguish be-
tween those acts not protected by the constitutional right to privacy and
those which are so protected is clearly unacceptable. The case where
the constitutional right to privacy had its origin was one involving con-
traception-a practice which the Augustinian view would deem unnat-
ural. 0 9 Yet, the Court has apparently concluded that the
"unnaturalness" of contraception or abortion is constitutionally inad-
missible and cannot limit the scope of the right to privacy. In consider-
ing the constitutional permissibility of allowing majoritarian notions of
the unnatural to justify limitations on the right to privacy, the Court
must take into account two crucial factors: (1) the absence of empirical
evidence or sound philosophical argument that these practices are un-
natural; and (2) the lack of any sound moral argument, premised on
equal concern and respect, that these practices are in any sense im-
moral. In particular, as we saw in the contraception and abortion deci-
sions, the Court impliedly rejected the legitimacy of both the classic
Augustinian view of human sexuality and the associated judgments
about the exclusive morality of marital procreational sex. The enforce-
ment of majoritarian prejudices, without any plausible empirical basis,
could be independently unconstitutional as a violation of due process
rationality in legislation. "0 To enforce such personal tastes in matters
touching basic autonomous life choices violates basic human rights.
The moral theory of the Constitution, built as a bulwark against "seri-
ous oppressions of the minor party in the community,"" I requires that
such human rights be upheld and protected against majoritarian
prejudices.
For the same reasons that notions of the unnatural are constitu-
tionally impermissible in decisions involving contraception, abortion,
and the use of pornography in the home, these ideas are also impermis-
sible in the constitutional assessment of laws prohibiting private forms
of sexual deviance between consenting adults. No empirical evidence
compels a finding that homosexuality is unnatural."12 Indeed, there
109. See notes 92-104 & accompanying text supra.
110. See Justice Stewart's remark, in the context of the permissibility of isolating the
harmless mentally ill on the ground that they failed to conform to normal behavior: "One
might as well ask if the State, to void public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically
unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitution-
ally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 575 (1975).
111. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), at 359 (Hallowell ed. 1857).
112. For a fuller account of the concept of the unnatural here employed, see Unnatural
Acts, supra note 9, at 1287-98. See also Levy, Perversion and the Unnatural as Moral
Categories,- ETHICS- (forthcoming).
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have been cultures that possessed normative assumptions of what is
natural that nevertheless did not regard homosexuality as unnatural.'
1 3
Indeed, societies (including ancient Greece) have included or include
homosexuality among legitimate sexual conduct, and some prescribe it
in the form of institutional pederasty. I"4 Individuals within our own
culture have assailed the view that homosexuality is unnatural by ad-
ducing various facts which traditionalists either did not know or did
not understand."I5 For example, it is now known that homosexual be-
havior takes place in the animal world, suggesting that homosexuality
is part of our mammalian heritage of sexual responsiveness." 16
Some have attempted to distinguish between individuals who are
exclusively homosexual and the general population based on symptoms
of mental illness' 17 or measures of self-esteem and self-acceptance."l 8
113. See K. DOVER, GREEK POPULAR MORALITY IN THE TIME OF PLATO AND ARIS-
TOTLE 213-16 (1974); FORD & BEACH, supra note 101, at 130-33; J. HENDERSON, THE MAC-
ULATE MUSE: OBSCENE LANGUAGE IN ATTIC COMEDY 204-22 (1975); H. LICHT, SEXUAL
LIFE IN ANCIENT GREECE 307-498 (1974); J. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN,
Boy & GIRL 125-44 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MONEY & EHRHARDT].
114. Id.
115. See W. CHURCHILL, HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR AMONG MALES 267-68 (1971); FORD
& BEACH, supra note 101, at 264-66; A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BE-
HAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 659-60 (1948) [hereinafter cited as KINSEY]; Sf M. HOFFMAN,
THE GAY WORLD 100-13 (1968) [hereinafter cited as HOFFMAN].
116. FORD & BEACH, supra note 101, at 134-43, 257-59. Contrast the traditional view,
expressed by philosophers as disparate as Plato and Kant, that sexual deviance degraded
human beings even below animals, since animals were supposed not to be sexually deviant.
Thus, Kant argues that homosexuality is unnatural in that it "degrades mankind below the
level of animals, for no animal turns in this way from its own species."; Vf. VLASTOS, PLA-
TONIC STUDIES 27-28 (1973).
117. See, e.g., Hooker, The Adjustment ofthe Male Overt Homosexual, 21 J. OF PROJEC-
TIVE TECHNIQUES 18 (1957); THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 31-33 (1963). In late 1973 the Board
of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) decided to remove homosexual-
ity from the list of mental diseases. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1973, § 1, at I, col. 1. The Board's
action was approved by a general vote of the APA membership in April, 1974. N.Y. Times,
April 9, 1974, § 1, at 12, col. 4. The position there rejected receives its classic statement in I.
BIEBER, HOMOSEXUALITY: A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALS (1962).
See also H. HENDIN, THE AGE OF SENSATION, ch. 4 (1975); C. SOCARIDES, BEYOND SEXUAL
FREEDOM, ch. 7 (1975); R. STOLLER, PERVERSION: THE EROTIC FORM OF HATRED (1975).
This position has now been repudiated largely on the ground that it is based only on those
homosexuals who have sought psychiatric help, many of whom suffer from neurotic symp-
toms, as do most patients who seek psychiatric help, heterosexual and homosexual. Thus,
from the class of neurotic homosexuals who seek psychiatric help, the view argues falla-
ciously that all homosexuals are neurotic. See M. HOFFMAN, supra note 115, ch. 9; J.
Marmor, Homosexuality and Sexual Orientation Disturbances, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXT-
BOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1510-20 (Freedman, Kaplan & Sadock eds.). In fact, when correct
scientific method is used to test whether homosexuals as a class exhibit neurotic symptoms,
no evidence appears. Hooker, supra. Freud himself well understood these distinctions. Of
homosexuality, Freud wrote: "Homosexuality is assuredly no advantage but it is nothing to
be ashamed of, no vice, no degradation; it cannot be classified as an illness; we consider it to
be a variation of the sexual function." LETTERS OF SIGMUND FREUD 1873-1939, at 419-20
In general, however, apart from their sexual preference, exclusive
homosexuals are psychologically indistinguishable from the general
population. 119
The view sometimes expressed that male homosexuality necessar-
ily involves the loss of desirable character traits probably rests on the
idea that sexual relations between males involve the degradation of one
or both parties to the status of a woman. °20 This view, however, rests
on intellectual confusion and unacceptable moral premises since it con-
fuses sexual preference with gender identity, whereas, in fact, no such
correlation exists. Male homosexuals or lesbians may be quite insistent
about their respective gender identities and have quite typical "mascu-
line" or "feminine" personalities. Their homosexuality is defined only
(E. Freud ed. 1961). In the absence of neurotic symptoms, he thus regarded homosexuals as
improper subjects for treatment. See A. FREUD, The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexu-
ality in a Woman, in 18 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD
(Standard ed. 1920). In the recent Kinsey Institute study of homosexuality, the authors di-
vide homosexuals into five functional categories (Close-Coupleds, Open-Coupleds, Func-
tionals, Dysfunctionals, and Asexuals) and observe that failure to make such distinctions
distorts one's realistic picture of the complex and diverse reality of homosexual relations.
The Close-Coupleds, essentially monogamous and stable unions, evince considerable psy-
chological health which may exceed that of comparable heterosexual unions. In contrast,
the Asexuals appear to be quite psychologically ill-adjusted. The conflation of these distinct
categories presents, the Kinsey study proposes, an unrealistic picture of homosexuality
which fails to capture fundamental distinctions among forms of adaptation to homosexual
preference in a hostile society. See A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY
OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 195-231 (1978) [hereinafter cited as BELL &
WEINBERG].
118. See M. WEINBERG & C. WILLIAMS, MALE HOMOSEXUALS 148-49 (1974).
119. See BELL & WEINBERG, supra note 117; W. CHURCHILL, HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR
AMONG MALES 36-59 (1967).
120. That is, it would be self-degradation for men to allow themselves to make love to,
or to be made love to by a man, which is the proper role of a woman. This conception is also
implicit in the idea, pervasive in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds, that while homosex-
uality per se was not wrong, to allow oneself to be the passive partner (i e., the woman) was
shameful and degrading. The aggressively bisexual Julius Caesar, thus, was criticized not
for his homosexual connections, but for permitting himself at one time to be the passive
partner. See CATULLUS 57 where Caesar is insulted by being called "morbosus," i e., pas-
sive (equivalent to the Greek "pathicus"). This interpretation of the condemnation of ho-
mosexuality (degrading a man into a woman) explains why lesbianism was never
condemned with the force that was directed against male homosexuality. The Old Testa-
ment prohibitions clearly seem to be directed against men. "Thou shalt not lie with man-
kind, as with womankind: it is abomination." Lepiticus 18:22. "If a man also lie with
mankind as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall
surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them." Id. 20:13. Note that lesbianism
carried far lighter penalties than did male homosexuality under later rabbinical law. See D.
BAILEY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE WESTERN CHRISTIAN TRADITION 61-63 (1955). For a
similar view of the extreme condemnation of male homosexuality, see J. McNEILL, THE
CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 83-87 (1976). The same has been true under Christian
religious law. Id. at 160-65.
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by their erotic preference for members of the same gender. 21 The no-
tion that the status of woman is a degradation is morally repugnant to
contemporary jurisprudence 122 and morality. 123 If such crude and un-
just sexual stereotypes lie at the bottom of antihomosexuality laws, they
should be uprooted, as is being done elsewhere in modem life.
124
Finally, homosexual preference appears to be an adaptation of
natural human propensities to very early social circumstances of cer-
tain kinds, 125 so that the preference is settled, largely irreversibly, at a
quite early age.
126
121. See, e.g., Simon & Gagnon, Femininity in the Lesbian Community, in SEXUAL DEVI-
ANCE AND SEXUAL DEVIANTS 256-67 (E. Goode & R. Troiden eds. 1974).
122. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1,485 P.2d 529,
95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (en banc). See generally L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW
(1969). On the need for a constitutional amendment to accelerate judicial and legislative
developments, see Equal Rights for Women: A Symposium on the Proposed Constitutional
Amendment, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 215 (1971); Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman,
The Equal Rights Amendment: 4 Constitutional Basisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE
L.J. 871 (1971); Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499 (1971). For a review of judicial developments and a
commentary on the justifiability thereof, see D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW
162-78 (1977).
123. See S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1952); E. JANEWAY, MAN'S WORLD, WO-
MAN'S PLACE (1971); J.S. MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (1869); D. RICHARDS, THE
MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 162-78 (1977); V. WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN (1929).
124. See authorities cited note 122 supra.
125. The origin of homosexual preference is unclear. Some experimental studies claim
to adduce evidence that sexual preference is genetically determined. See D. WEST, HOMO-
SEXUALITY 169 (1967). These studies, however, are given little credence. See C. BERG & C.
ALLEN, THE PROBLEM OF HOMOSEXUALITY 41 (1958); B. OLIVER, SEXUAL DEVIATION IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 126 (1967); SEX INFORMATION AND EDUCATION COUNCIL OF THE
UNITED STATES, SEXUALITY AND MAN 78-80 (1970). The theory that homosexuality is due
to hormonal imbalance has been rejected. BERG & ALLEN, supra, at 41; FORD & BEACH,
supra note 101, at 236-37; MONEY & EHRHARDT, supra note 113, at 235-44; OLIVER, supra,
at 126; WEST, supra, at 155-60. The prevailing view now seems to be that homosexual pref-
erence results, not from inform physical characteristics, but from experiences during the
individual's lifetime. WEST, supra, at 262. See also OLIVER, supra, at 126. One psychoana-
lytic explanation of male homosexuality suggests that it results from a parent-child relation-
ship that includes a seductive, over-attached, domineering mother and a detached, hostile or
remote father. I. BIEBER, HOMOSEXUALITY: A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF MALE HOMO-
SEXUALS 310-13 (1962). Other explanations focus on more general social experience, re-
jecting the crucial significance of parent-child relationships of these kinds. C. TRIPP, THE
HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX, chs. 4-5 (1975). The increasing weight of modern evidence points to
the importance of very early social experience. See HOFFMAN, supra note 115, at 112-27;
MONEY & EHRHARDT, supra note 113, at 153-201. Thus, one study hypothesizes that gender
identity and sexual object choice coincide with the development of language, ie., from 18 to
24 months of age. See Money, Hampson & Hampson, An Examination of Some Basic Sexual
Concepts: The Evidence ofHuman Hernaphroditism, 97 BULL. JOHN HOPKINS Hosp. 301
(1955).
126. For the substantial irreversibility of sexual preference, see W. CHURCHILL, HoMo-
The cumulative impact of such facts is clear. The notion of "un-
natural acts," interpreted in terms of a fixed procreational model of
sexual functioning, deviations from which result in inexorable damage
or degradation, is not properly applied to homosexual acts performed
in private between consenting adults. Such activity is clearly a natural
expression of human sexual competences and sensitivities, and does not
reflect any form of damage, decline or injury.' 27 To deny the accepta-
bility of such acts is itself a human evil, a denial of the distinctive
human capacities for loving and sensual experience without ulterior
procreative motives-in a plausible sense, itself unnatural.
There is consequently no logically consistent explanation for the
Court's refusal to enforce concepts of the "unnatural" in the case of
contraception while permitting statutes based on similar concepts to
prohibit sexual deviance. Indeed, the moral arguments in the latter
case are more compelling. For one thing, at the time Griswold was de-
cided, statutes condemning and prohibiting forms of contraception
probably no longer reflected a majoritarian understanding of the un-
naturalness of this form of birth control. 28 Accordingly, the need for
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AMONG MALES 283-91 (1971): C. TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX
251 (1975); WEST, supra note 125, at 266. Claimed cure rates by psychotherapists probably
include instances in which the individual is merely refraining from homosexual conduct
while retaining his or her homosexual inclinations, and fail to indicate whether those alleged
to be changed remained heterosexually oriented. W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 227 (1973). For a discussion of change techniques employed by therapists.
see L. HATTERER, CHANGING HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE MALE (1970).
127. See note 117 supra. Venereal disease is one health problem that might be adduced
in this connection on the ground that it is common among homosexuals. In fact, however,
there is no necessary connection between homosexuality and the incidence of venereal dis-
ease; and in any event, there is reason to believe that the incidence of venereal disease
among homosexuals has been fostered, not prohibited, by sodomy statutes. As regards the
incidence of venereal disease among homosexuals, two significant classes of homosexuals do
not involve the venereal disease problem: (1) Lesbians do not in general suffer from vene-
real disease in that they "practically never become infected except through contact with
men," G. HENRY, ALL THE SEXES 366 (1955); (2) Stable homosexual relations, male and
female, do not implicate the disease. In general, the root of the venereal disease problem
among homosexuals arises from isolated, promiscuous relations among male homosexuals,
not from the form of intercourse itself. This promiscuity among homosexuals is fostered by
absolute prohibitions on all forms of homosexual relations and concomitant forms of eco-
nomic and social discrimination. Indeed, medical attempts to treat the problem are made
more difficult by lack of candor by homosexuals about their sexual life and preference, aris-
ing from fears of criminal penalties and related forms of discrimination. Seegenerally Note,
The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV.
1613, 1631-33 (1974).
128. In Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), the predecessor case to Griswold, an impor-
tant reason forjudicial abstention was Justice Frankfurter's view that lack of enforcement of
the Connecticut contraception law evinced complete lack of belief in the law by enforcement
officials and the citizenry of Connecticut. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
143-56 (1962).
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constitutional protection, while proper, was not exigent. 129 In the case
of homosexuality, however, there is good reason to believe that, as a
group, homosexuals are subject to exactly the kind of unjust social ha-
tred that constitutional guarantees were designed to combat.13
0
A second way by which the Court might justify its restricted appli-
cation of the right of privacy would be to focus on the morality of the
acts in question. Presumably, the naturalness of homosexual experi-
ence would not in itself legitimize such experience, if homosexuality
were shown to be immoral. There is, however, no sound moral argu-
ment to sustain any longer the idea that homosexuality is intrinsically
immoral.
The concept of morality, proposed herein, puts certain con-
straints-mutual respect, universalization, minimization of fortu-
ity-on the kinds of beliefs and arguments that can properly be
regarded as ethical in nature. Certainly, such constraints would dictate
certain prohibitions and regulations of sexual conduct. For example,
respect for the development of capacities of autonomous rational
choice would require that various liberties, guaranteed to mature
adults, might not extend to persons presumably lacking rational capaci-
ties, such as children. Nor is there any objection to the reasonable reg-
ulation of obtrusive sexual solicitations or, of course, to forcible forms
of intercourse of any kind. Such regulations or prohibitions would se-
cure a more equal expression of autonomy compatible with a like lib-
erty for all, thus advancing underlying values of equal concern and
respect. In addition, forms of sexual expression would be limited by
other moral principles that would be universalized compatibly with
equal concern and respect, for example: principles of not killing, harm-
ing or inflicting gratuitous cruelty; principles of paternalism in nar-
129. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 143-56 (1962).
130. Like racial and ethnic minorities, exclusive homosexuals constitute a quite small
percentage of the nation's population. Kinsey stated that four per cent of white males are
exclusively homosexual throughout their lives. KINSEY, supra note 115, at 650-51. Kinsey's
figures may even overstate the incidence of male homosexuality. See PLAYBOY, Mar. 1974,
at 54-55. No major political party has yet espoused the rights of homosexuals. American
popular and legal attitudes towards homosexuals derive from traditional Christianity's ab-
horrence of homosexuality. See Unnatural Acts, supra note 9, at 1292-98. The cases are
replete with expressions of judicial revulsion at homosexuality, something now unthinkable
in the racial or gender area. See, e.g., Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Ct. Cl.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970); In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 927 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); H. v. H., 59 NJ. Super. 227, 237, 157 A.2d 721,727 (1959); In re Schmidt, 56 Misc. 2d
456, 460, 289 N.Y.S.2d 89, 92 (Sup. Ct. 1968). Not surprisingly, empirical surveys confirm
the attitudes expressed or commented on in judicial opinions. Fifty per cent of respondents
in one study, all "from large cities in the United States agree 'very much' that homosexuality
is obscene and vulgar." M. WEINBERG & C. WILLIAMS, MALE HOMOSEXUALS 84 (1974).
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rowly defined circumstances; and principles of fidelity.' 3 1 Thus, as
formulated, the relevant limiting moral and constitutional principles
permit some reasonable, legitimate restrictions on complete individual
freedom.
Statutes that absolutely prohibit deviant sexual acts such as that
considered in De132 cannot be justified consistently with the principles
just discussed. Such statutes are not limited to forcible or public forms
of sexual intercourse, or to sexual intercourse by or with children but
extend to private, consensual acts between adults as well. To say that
such laws are justified by their indirect effect of stopping homosexual
intercourse by or with the underaged would be as absurd as to claim
that absolute prohibitions on heterosexual intercourse could be simi-
larly justified. There is no reason to believe that homosexuals as a class
are any more involved in offenses with the young than heterosexuals. 133
Nor is there any reliable evidence that such laws inhibit children from
being naturally homosexual who would otherwise be naturally hetero-
sexual. Sexual preference is settled, largely irreversibly, in very early
childhood well before laws of this kind could have any effect. 134 If the
state has any legitimate interest in determining the sexual preference of
its citizens, which is doubtful, 135 that interest cannot constitutionally be
secured by overbroad statutes that tread upon the rights of exclusive
homosexuals of all ages 136 and that, in any event, irrationally pursue
131. For a more extended argument for principles of these kinds, see D. RICHARDS, A
THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 148-95 (1971).
132. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), a 'g without
opinion 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three judge court). See note 5 supra.
133. See P. GEBHARD, J. GAGNON, W. POMEROY, & C. CHRISTENSON, SEX OFFENDERS
(1965); HOFFMAN, supra note 115, at 89-92. Analysis of imprisonment statistics of homosex-
uals sometimes shows high percentages of arrests for offenses against children. See, e.g., C.
BERG, FEAR, PUNISHMENT, ANXIETY AND THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 33-34 (1959); cf. R.
MITCHELL, THE HOMOSEXUAL AND THE LAW 11 (1969). However, these higher percentages
probably simply reflect the fact that homosexuals who molest children are far more fre-
quently apprehended than homosexual people who engage only in consensual relations with
adults. In general, seduction of the young appears to be more centered on heterosexual
rather than homosexual relations. See BELL & WEINBERG, supra note 117, at 230. Impor-
tantly, the failure to note the distinction between homosexuality and pedophilia is deplored
by the majority of homosexual people who "do not share, do not approve, and fear to be
associated with pedophiliac interests." D. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY 119 (1967); see Rivera,
Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 860 n.367 (1979). On the impropriety of forbidding adults access to
obscene books on the ground that access to such books harms children, see Butler v. Michi-
gan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
134. See note 125 supra.
135. It is not at all self-evident that it has such a constitutionally legitimate interest. See
generally Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923), which question the propriety of certain types of state regulation of the education
of children.
136. Consider, for example, the claims that prohibiting all homosexual conduct and ho-
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the claimed interest.
Other moral principles also fail to justify absolute prohibitions on
consensual sexual deviance. Homosexual relations, for example, are
not generally violent. Thus, prohibitory statutes could not be justified
by moral principles of nonmaleficence. 137 There is no convincing evi-
dence that homosexuality is either harmful to the homosexual or corre-
lated with any form of mental or physical disease or defect. 38 To the
contrary, there is evidence that antihomosexuality laws, which either
force homosexuals into heterosexual marriage unnatural for them or
otherwise distort and disfigure the reasonable pursuit of natural emo-
tional fulfillment, harm homosexuals and others in deep and perma-
nent ways. 39 Accordingly, principles of legitimate state paternalism do
not here come into play.
mosexual teachers protects the young. In fact, homosexual preference has its origins in very
early social experience within the family often prior to any formal education. See note 125,
supra. Prohibitions of this kind accordingly have no effect on sexual preference and thus are
not rationally related to this end, but do inflict great and unfair harms on homosexuals of all
ages. Adult homosexuals are often gifted teachers. See J. McNEILL, S.J., THE CHURCH
AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 135-38 (1976). These prohibitions either penalize their being teach-
ers or allow them to do so only on hypocritical terms which violate their rights of self-respect
based on personal integrity. Society is thus deprived of a social asset or secures it only on
immoral terms.
In addition, there is a fundamental unfairness in allowing teachers to be publicly heter-
osexual, which affords the heterosexual young role models of how to build a life around
their sexuality, and not to allow teachers to be publicly homosexual, thus depriving the
homosexual young of the education that is any person's right in how to build a life of sexual
self-respect. The effect of such public knowledge on the heterosexual young is to discourage
in them immoral stereotypes and to develop desirable ethical attitudes of tolerance and re-
spect for the diversities of human fulfillment. Present prohibitions, on the contrary, teach
and support immoral and inhumane attitudes which are destructive to the young and to
society at large.
Consider, as a useful analogy, the first attacks on racial segregation in the area of ele-
mentary education, attacks that have since been enlarged to encompass all forms of state-
supported racial discrimination. Such constitutional attacks understandably began in the
area of elementary education because undoing racial segregation at this point cuts racist
isolation and misunderstanding at its roots. A comparable argument of equivalent force
could be made regarding the sexist stereotypes that underlie much antihomosexuality
prejudice. These sexist stereotypes retain their force because of compelled ignorance about
the nature of homosexuality and homosexuals and the failure of people publicly to acknowl-
edge the irrelevance of sexual preference to any fair measure of moral decency, humanity, or
good citizenship. In order to cut at the roots of these unjust and immoral attitudes in igno-
rance and isolation, public acknowledgement and toleration of sexual diversity in teachers
and students in early education appears as necessary and useful here as it was and is in the
case of racism. Finally, of course, no teacher or guardian of the young, heterosexual or
homosexual, has the right to seduce the underage young.
137. See R. MITCHELL, THE HOMOSEXUAL AND THE LAW 12 (1969). In fact, there is
evidence that homosexuals are less violent than heterosexuals. See HOFFMAN, supra note
115, at 90-91.
138. See note 117 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 228-43 infra.
One quite relevant set of facts that would justify prohibitions of
homosexuality would be empirical support for the view that homosexu-
ality is a kind of degenerative social poison that leads directly to dis-
ease, social disorder and disintegration. 140 Principles of constitutional
justice must be compatible with the stability of institutions of social
cooperation. Thus, if the above allegation were true, prohibition of ho-
mosexuality might be justified on the ground that such prohibition
would preserve the constitutional order, so that justice on balance
would be secured. These beliefs are quite untenable today, however.
Many nations, including several in Western Europe, 14 1 have long al-
lowed homosexual acts between consenting adults, with no consequent
social disorder or disease.
One final moral argument has been used to justify a general prohi-
bition upon homosexuality-the argument invoked by the district court
in Doe as "the promotion of morality and decency."' 142 That court be-
lieved this to be the ultimate ground for the legitimacy of the Virginia
sodomy statute. The argument takes three forms: (1) a general juris-
prudential thesis about the relation of law and morals; (2) an interpre-
tation of the moral principles discussed previously; and (3) the point of
view of a certain form of theological ethics. None of these views can be
sustained.
The classic modern statement of the jurisprudential thesis was
made by Devlin 143 against Hart,14 4 repeating many of the arguments
earlier made by Stephen 145 against Mill. 146 The Devlin-Hart debate
centered on the jurisprudential interpretation of the Wolfenden Re-
port, 147 which recommended, inter alia, the abolition of the imposition
of criminal penalties for homosexual acts between consenting adults.
Devlin, in questioning the Report, focused on the proposition that cer-
tain private immoral acts are not the law's business. The criminal law,
Devlin argued, is completely unintelligible without reference to moral-
ity, which it enforces. The fact that two parties agree to kill one an-
other, for example, does not relieve the killer of criminal liability, for
140. See UnnaturalActs, supra note 9, at 1294-95.
141. See BARNETr, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 293, 305-07 (1973). En-
gland has also recently legalized sexual conduct between consenting adults. Sexual Offenses
Act, 1967, c. 60.
142. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
143. See generally P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 9-13 (1965).
144. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).
145. J. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 135-78 (1967).
146. J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 271-93 (M.
Cohen ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as On Liberty].
147. COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, REPORT, CMMD.
No. 247 (1957). See the similar view taken in MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5(1), comment
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
March 1979] SEXUAL AUTONOMY AND RIGHT TO PRIVACY 991
the act in question if immoral. The privacy of the act (between con-
senting adults perhaps in the privacy of the home) is-irrelevant. Simi-
larly, the criminal law in general arises from morality. Morality,
Devlin maintains, is the necessary condition of the existence of society.
Thus, to change the law in such a way as to violate that morality is to
threaten the stability of the social order. Morality, in this connection, is
to be understood in terms of the ordinary man's intuitive sense of right
and wrong, as determined, Devlin suggests, by taking a man at ran-
dom. Just as we prove the standards of negligence for purposes of civil
or criminal liability by appealing to the judgment of ordinary men act-
ing as jurors, so may we prove applicable standards of morality. Ordi-
nary men morally loathe homosexuality; accordingly, homosexuality is
immoral and must be legally forbidden.
Superficially, Devlin's argument appears to be constitutionally ac-
ceptable. There should be no constitutional objection to prohibiting
clearly immoral acts that threaten the existence of society. Further, it is
surely plausible that law and morals have a deep and systematic con-
nection of the kind Devlin suggests. 4 8 Nevertheless, such abstractly
plausible propositions will not support the specific argument which
Devlin propounds. Although Devlin is probably correct in asserting
that the criminal law arises from the morality that it enforces, he never-
theless falsely identifies morality with conventional social views in a
way that renders unthinkable, if not unintelligible, the whole idea of
moral criticism and reform of social convention. Adoption of this view
would effectively turn the measure of legally enforceable moral ideas
into an interim victory of one set of contending ideological forces over
another. 49 Moreover, there is no good reason to make this identifica-
tion of morality and social convention, since it is based on an indefen-
sible and naive moral philosophy as well as an unexamined and
unsound sociology.
150
The attraction of Devlin's theory for judges is its apparent objec-
tivity; it affords a definite criterion for the morality that the law en-
forces without appeal to subjective considerations.' 5' But the empirical
objectivity of existing custom has nothing to do with the notions of
moral impartiality and objectivity that are, or should be, of judicial
concern in determining the public morality on which the law rests. The
idea that the pursuit of the latter must collapse into the former is a
148. See D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION, chs. 7-10 (1971).
149. See Gussfield, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process of Designating
Deviance, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 54, 58-59 (1968).
150. See Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement ofMorality, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. I
(1967).
151. For the classic statement of this view by an American judge, see B. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 108-11, 112, 131, 136 (1921).
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confusion of inquiries, arising from an untenable and indefensible dis-
tinction between subjective moral belief and the public morality of the
law. There is no such distinction. Views, to be moral, require a certain
kind of justification. Judges, in interpreting legally enforceable moral
ideas, must appeal to the kind of reasoning that is moral. They do not
as judges abdicate their responsibility for moral reasoning as persons.
On the contrary, competence and clarity in such reasoning comprise
the virtue that we denominate judicial.
Devlin's theory is for such reasons theoretically and practically un-
acceptable. Even if it could be defended on such grounds, however, it
must be rejected as it is incompatible with the moral theory of human
rights implicit in the constitutional order. The Constitution rests on the
idea that moral rights of individuals cannot be violated, notwithstand-
ing majoritarian sentiments to the contrary. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has rightly upheld constitutional rights against popular racial
and sexual prejudices. 152 Prejudices against the vulnerable, largely
powerless homosexual minority must be similarly circumscribed. 15 3
That this popular argument for preserving moral standards is ob-
jectionable in moral and constitutional principle is then apparent. The
district court in Doe, however, employed another form of argument,
not similarly objectionable, as it rests on an interpretation of the moral
principles which do relevantly regulate sexual conduct. It suggested
that the moral issue before it was not that homosexuality is objectiona-
ble per se, but rather that in the present state of society homosexuality
tends to evade certain moral principles, for example, principles of
fidelity intrinsic in heterosexual marriage and family obligations. 54
The court's use of this argument is, however, fundamentally fallacious.
In support of its proposition, the court cited a case that involved fellatio
among a married couple and a third adult and distribution of pictures
of the said acts in school by the couple's daughters (aged 11 and 13).
152. Historically, racial and sexual prejudices were interdependent; the inferiority of
blacks was used as a ground for arguments for the inferiority of women, and conversely. See
note 54 supra. For evidence of the psychological interrelationships of racial and sexual
prejudice, see T. ADORNO, E. FRENKEL-BRUNSWICK, D. LEVINSON & R. SANFORD, THE
AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY, 399-441, 452-54, 506-17, 866-72 (1950). See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contracep-
tion for unmarried persons); Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967) (miscegenation); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (segregated education). See also note 122 supra.
153. See note 130 supra.
154. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D.
Va. 1975). The Court, thus, focused on the analysis of Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620
(E.D. Va. 1973), affid, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
This case involved both a breach of the traditional marital bond (a threesome, two of whom
are a married couple, engaging in fellatio) and elements of degradation of the young (the
children, aged 11 and 13, who distributed pictures of their parents' activities in school).
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The latter fact was alleged to show that conduct not immoral in itself
may be condemned because "the conduct is likely to end in a contribu-
tion to moral delinquency."' I55 The citation of a case of apparently het-
erosexual sodomy, involving clear elements of a waiver of privacy
rights as evidence for the propriety of proscribing clearly private homo-
sexual sex is a remarkable nonsequitur, illustrating the kind of shabby
reasoning to which courts are driven in order to lend a shred of moral
plausibility to these prohibitions.
Aside from this specific argumentative fallacy, there remains the
general intuition that homosexuality, if allowed, would violate moral
principles implicit in the institution of the heterosexual family. While
this line of thought has the general form of an acceptable moral and
constitutional argument, its factual assumptions are utterly unsup-
ported by evidence. For example, the argument makes the unsup-
ported assumption that prohibiting homosexuality would encourage
heterosexual marriage. But, as Judge Merhige indicated in his dissent
in Doe, such a claim is so empirically flimsy as to be "unworthy of
judicial response."' 56 For one thing, historical and contemporary data
show that homosexual connections are compatible with heterosexual
marriage. 57 The many countries which have legalized homosexual re-
lations show no decline in the incidence of heterosexual marriage.1
58 It
thus appears that prohibitions of homosexual relations have no effect
on heterosexual marriage.
59
The intuition regarding homosexuality and the decline of the het-
155. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
156. Id. at 1205 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
157. For example, in ancient Greece and in many primitive societies, the preferred
model was homosexual relations and heterosexual marriage. See note 113 supra. The
United States data illustrates that this pattern still persists; homosexual and heterosexual
relations can coexist in the same person either at one time or over time. See KINSEY, supra
note 115, at 610-66.
158. See BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 293 (1973).
159. Some homosexuals do marry and have children. P. WILSON, THE SEXUAL DI-
LEMMA 52-53 (1971). In general, those whose sexuality is entirely homosexual can function
heterosexually for periods of time. D. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY 233-34 (1968); Knight, Overt
Male Homosexuality, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 442-43 (R. Slovenko ed. 1965).
By employing sexual fantasies of a person for whom they experience erotic feeling, people
can thus have intercourse with people in whom they experience nothing erotic. Note Kin-
sey's description of how people have intercourse with prostitutes they find unattractive: "As
far as his psychologic responses are concerned, the male in many instances may not be hav-
ing coitus with the immediate sexual partner, but with all of the other girls with whom he
has ever had coitus, and with the entire genus Female with which he would like to have
coitus." A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN & P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
HUMAN FEMALE 684 (1953). In the case of exclusive homosexuals, the effect of thus frustrat-
ing natural feeling to conform to conventional models of conduct is probably to starve and
waste resources of spontaneous and individual human feeling. See text accompanying notes
180-243 infra for amplification of this idea.
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erosexual family is ancient. 60 According to this view, consensual ho-
mosexual acts in private are not of social concern, but the way of life
that such sex acts exemplify is. To legitimate these sex acts is to legiti-
mate an undesirable way of life; thus these sex acts, even in private
between consenting adults, may justly be prohibited.
The substance of this intuitive allegation should be examined with
care, for a form of it bears the imprimatur of the Supreme Court it-
self.16 1 The suggestion is this: public knowledge of the legitimacy of
homosexual acts would undermine the capacity of heterosexuals to sus-
tain the way of life required for the monogamous nuclear family and
the personal sacrifices that such a way of life requires. But no one in
the Western cultural tradition could reasonably claim that the existence
of legitimate alternative ways of life outside heterosexual marriage un-
dermine social stability. The legitimacy of remaining unmarried has
not undermined the heterosexual family. Indeed, one form of the un-
married state, religious celibacy, has long been regarded by influential
Western religions as sanctified; this fact has not, however, made the
heterosexual family less stable.
Why, then, should the recognition of homosexuality as a legitimate
way of life be treated in a radically different way? The suggestion must
be that homosexual preference is so strong and universal and hetero-
sexual preference so weak (and conventional family life so unattrac-
tive) that people would on a massive scale tend not to undertake
heterosexual marriage if homosexuality as a way of life were legitimate.
But, as we have seen, there is not even a shred of empirical support for
these views. While a small minority of the population naturally exper-
iences erotic pleasure exclusively with people of the same gender, the
great majority is exclusively heterosexual.
162
Aside from the facts of natural eroticism, the attractions of hetero-
sexual marriage are deep-seated and permanent features of the human
condition. Human beings, generally raised in the nuclear heterosexual
family, naturally regard the cooperation and creative sharing that typi-
fies the heterosexual family as the answer, or part of the answer, to the
recurrent human problem of loneliness and isolation. For most people,
conventional marriage is and will long remain the standard-supplying
a natural response to human needs for sexual release, intimacy, and the
desire for tangible immortality (child-rearing). It is a bizarre failure of
160. See Plato's suggestion that the prohibition of homosexuality "wins men to affection
of their wedded wives." PLATO, LAWS, bk. VIII, at 337 (T. Saunders trans. 1970). For com-
mentary, see G. GRUBE, PLATO'S THOUGHT 118-19 (1964).
161. See the development of this argument in the obscenity context in Paris Adult Thea-
tre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); for critical commentary thereon, see Richards, Free
Speech and Obscenity Law. Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 45, 83-90 (1974).
162. See note 130 supra.
[Vol. 30
March 1979] SEXUAL AUTONOMY AND RIGHT TO PRIVACY 995
imagination and perspective so to underestimate the attractions of fam-
ily life as to suppose that the legitimacy of homosexuality as a way of
life would have any significant effect on it at all. Even in this era of
growing sexual freedom and rising divorce rates, there is no sign that
heterosexual marriage as an institution is in general less attractive. The
rising divorce rates show, not a distaste for marriage, but only less will-
ingness to stick with the original partners in marriage. The important
and striking feature of this phenomenon is that divorced people typi-
cally remarry; they reject their previous partner, not the institution of
marriage itself.' 63
Certainly, the crude argument that if everyone were homosexual
there would, disastrously, be an end of the human species universalizes
absurdly a principle not seriously debated, namely, that everyone
should or must be homosexual. Rather, the principle under discussion
is whether, given the overwhelming naturally heterosexual majority
and the small naturally homosexual minority, the state should, at a
minimum, be tolerantly neutral between sexual preferences.
The "way of life" argument cannot be sustained as an empirical
proposition, even though it can be understood as the psychological resi-
due of fear and loathing unmistakably left by the long tradition that
condemned homosexuality and nonprocreative sex in general as unnat-
ural. 164 The existence and nature of these prejudices, which take the
form of homophobia, are interesting and important psychological ques-
tions. They are probably significantly connected to a standard mascu-
line fear of passivity and feminine rejection of aggressive activity, 165 of
which male or female homosexuality, respectively, is mistakenly sup-
posed the ultimate symbol. 166 Homophobia thus appears as a form of
intrapsychic defense against any suggestion of "unmasculine" passivity
or "unfeminine" aggressiveness. 67 Such underlying stereotypes are
under widespread attack today: many men and women, heterosexual
and homosexual, justly refuse any longer to dichotomize and disfigure
their natures along poles of conventional masculine-feminine stereo-
163. See generally M. BANE, HERE TO STAY (1976). For a discussion of the gravity of
the overpopulation problem, see M. MESAROVIC & E. PESTEL, MANKIND AT THE TURNING
POINT, THE SECOND REPORT TO THE CLUB OF ROME 70-82 (1974); for an argument for
moral duties to limit population, see D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION
134-35 (1971). Given the state of the facts as we have discussed them above and the growing
moral concerns for overpopulation, the direction of good moral reasoning appears to sup-
port, at a minimum, toleration, and suggests that, so far from mandatory universal heterosex-
uality being the moral course, if any sexual preference is to be encouraged by the state it is
certainly not heterosexuality.
164. See UnnaturalActs, supra note 9, at 1292-98.
165. See G. WEINBERG, SOCIETY AND THE HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL 1-20 (1972); cf. note
120 supra.
166. See note 130 & accompanying text supra.
167. See note 165 supra.
types that are unjust in principle, no longer socially sensible, and inhu-
manely unfulfilling to individuals. 16  Clearly, as a matter of law, the
prejudices based on such stereotypes should have no force independent
of the empirical assumptions on which they rest. Undoubtedly, resi-
dues of guilt and fear remain long after we reject on rational grounds
the beliefs on which those guilts and fears rest. But, this psychological
truth does not validate such regressive emotions as a legitimate basis
for law. If the life of reason requires us to circumscribe such negative
emotions as a basis for ethical conduct, the morality of law can require
no less. 16
9
In any event, it is difficult to understand how the state has the
right, on moral grounds, to protect heterosexual love at the expense of
homosexual love. Equal concern and respect for autonomous choice
seem precisely to forbid the kind of calculation that this sort of sacrifice
contemplates.170 In principle, these values, as we have seen, forbid the
sacrifice of the fundamental interests of one group in order to secure
the greater happiness of other groups or of the whole. These values
prescribe moral and constitutional benchmarks of human decency,
resting on respect for the interest of all persons equally in general
goods, and thereby the power of majority rule to plough under the in-
terests of minorities is limited.
Finally, there is reason to believe that the argument for protecting
marriage and the family is hypocritically proposed. If the argument
were meant seriously, state laws against fornication and adultery would
be vigorously pressed in addition to the anti-homosexuality laws. But,
in many states, such laws either do not exist or penalize homosexuality
much more severely than heterosexual offenses.' 17 This suggests what
should by now be reasonably clear: antihomosexuality laws rest not on
reasonable moral argument consistently pursued, but on ancient
prejudice and the last remaining vestige of ideas, elsewhere eschewed,
of unnatural sexual witchcraft and demonology. 172
The last available form of moral argument in support of absolute
168. For the position of men, see H. GOLDBERG, THE HAZARDS OF BEING MALE (1976);
H.E. KAYE, MALE SURVIVAL: MASCULINITY WITHOUT MYTH (1974); J. NICHOLS, MEN'S
LIBERATION: A NEW DEFINITION OF MASCULINITY (1975); MEN AND MASCULINITY 21-29,
32-35, 35-41, 41-52, 139-49 (J.H. Pleck & J. Sawyer eds. 1974). For the position of women,
see C.G. HEILBRUN, TOWARD A RECOGNITION OF ANDROGYNY (1973); MEN AND MASCU-
LINITY, supra, at 134-39; and sources cited note 123 supra.
169. Cf. Dworkin, Lord Deplin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966),
reprinted in DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 240-58 (1977).
170. See note 136 supra.
171. See statutes cited in Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Pripate Homo-
sexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613, 1622-23 nn.63-67 (1974).
172. See generally R. MASTERS, EROS AND EVIL: THE SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF
WITCHCRAFT (1962). For the more general social significance of notions of withchcraft, see
WITCHCRAFT AND SORCERY (M. Marwick ed. 1970).
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prohibitions of consensual adult homosexual relations, certainly im-
plicit in Devlin's argument, is that of theological ethics-the moral
principles enforceable at law are dictated by the Judaeo-Christian God.
Since traditional Judaeo-Christian thought appears to condemn non-
procreative sex in general and homosexuality in particular,173 these
condemnations, being by definition moral, may be enforced at law.
There are two conclusive objections to this argument: one moral, the
other constitutional.
Morally, invoking theological ethics in support of the moral con-
demnation of homosexuality runs afoul of a philosophical argument of
metaethical principle and a normative argument of casuistry.
Metaethically, there are powerful objections to a theological analysis of
morality without appeal to the constraints of mutual respect, universal-
ization, and minimization of fortuity previously discussed. Certainly,
the traditional view of Christian theology has been that moral concepts
have a natural authority antecedent to divine revelation; 74 accord-
ingly, moral concepts even for theologians must be explicable without a
circular appeal to divine revelation. Metaethically, moral reasoning is
logically independent of religious reasoning. Accordingly, it is falla-
cious to invoke purely theological reasoning to rebut the independent
force of a valid moral argument. Psychological studies of moral devel-
opment suggest that ethical reasoning is, in fact, unrelated to religious
training or affiliation. 175 Normatively, the tradition of theological casu-
istry, on which Devlin rests his case, is now under critical scrutiny from
within theology. There is growing controversy within religious groups
173. See Barrett, Legal Homophobia and the Christian Church, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1019
(1979); Unnatural Acts, supra note 9, at 1292-98.
174. St. Thomas, for example, postulates a "special natural habit, which we call synder-
esis" which contains the first principles of morality. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I, at 116 (Fa-
thers of the Dominican Province trans. 1912). These principles of natural law, prior to any
divine revelation, are known as true by "one standard of truth or rightness of everybody,"
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, in AQUINAS: SELECTED POLITICAL WRINTINGS 123-5 (D'Entreves
trans. 1959), for "natural law corresponds to the order of our natural inclinations," id. at
123. Francisco Suarez similarly argues that the essence of morality is independent of divine
will. See F. SUAREZ, On Laws and God the Lawgiver, in SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS
205-06 (Williams, Brown, Waldron, & Davis trans. 1944). The separation of the concepts of
ethics and divine will is explicit in Grotius, who observes: "And what we have said would
still have great weight, even if we were to grant what we cannot grant without wickedness,
that there is no God," Grotius Prolegomenon, in DE JuRE BELLI ET PACIS xlvi (W. Whewell
trans. 1853). "Natural law is so immutable that it cannot be changed by God himself." Id.
at 12. Indeed, the view that natural law depended on divine law seems to have been theo-
logically revolutionary and heretical. See Oakley, Medieval Theories of Natural Law.- Wil-
liam of Ockham and the Signjqcance of the Voluntarist Tradition, 6 NAT. L.F. 65 (1961).
For a useful view of the objections to an ethics based on religious authority alone, see
R. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY 56-82 (1959).
175. L. Kohlberg, Moral and Relilious Education and the Public Schools: A Developmen-
tal View, in RELIGION AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS 164, 179-81 (T. Sizer ed. 1967).
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as to the proper interpretation of Biblical prohibitions conventionally
believed to condemn homosexuality, 176 and indeed invoked to this end
by the lower court in Doe. 177 This tradition of rational theology, in-
cluding attacks by Catholic theologians on the procreational model of
sexuality, 178 indicates that even the religious foundations on which
these laws were constructed are now seen to be jerry-built.
Finally, whatever the constitutional permissibility of the frank in-
vocation of theological ethics in Devlin's England where Church and
State are not constitutionally separate, in the United States the free ex-
ercise and establishment of religion clauses of the first amendment
stand as an absolute bar to the enforcement of theological ethics of the
form implicit in Devlin's argument. 179 Our earlier analysis of the struc-
ture of constitutional morality clarifies why this is so. The primary pos-
tulate of the American Constitution is the moral principle of religious
tolerance, the idea of fundamental constitutionally mandated neutrality
between the disparate visions of the good life at the profound level of
personal self-definition occupied by religious and philosophical beliefs.
Accordingly, constitutional principles require that only those principles
may be legally enforced which express the values of equal concern and
respect for autonomous self-definition in terms of the many permissible
176. Thus, the Sodom and Gomorrah episode, Genesis 19, traditionally taken to show
that homosexuality is contrary to God's will in that He punished those cities by fire and
brimstone, is apparently not about homosexuality at all. See D. BAILEY, HOMOSEXUALITY
AND THE WESTERN CHRISTIAN TRADITION 1-28 (1955); J. McNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE
HOMOSEXUAL 42-50 (1976). Even the seemingly clear Leviticus prohibitions, supra, note
120, have been analyzed by Biblical scholars as not being about homosexuality per se. See,
e.g., S. DRIVER, DEUTERONOMY 264 (1896); McNEILL, supra, at 56-60, N. SNAITH, THE
CENTURY BIBLE: LEVITICUS AND NUMBERS 126 n.22 (New ed. 1967). Other scholars, how-
ever, disagree about this latter prohibition. See BAILEY, supra, at 30. Even Catholic theolo-
gians have argued that these prohibitions do not attack or condemn exclusive homosexuals:
"[The Scriptures'] aim is not to pillory the fact that some people experience this perversion
inculpably. They denounce a homosexuality which had become the prevalent fashion and
had spread to many who were really quite capable of normal sexual sentiments. . . . Lack
of frank discussion has allowed a number of opinions to be formed about [homosexuals]
which are unjust when applied generally, because those who have such inclinations in fact
are often hard-working and honourable people." A NEW CATECHISM 384-85 (K. Smith
trans. 1967), citedin In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); cf. BAILEY, supra,
at x-xii (similar distinction between the invert and pervert).
177. 403 F. Supp. at 1202 n.2. Such citation of Old Testament texts in support of the
intrinsic evil of homosexuality is common in American judicial opinions. See, e.g., Dawson
v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1329 (S.D. Tex. 1971), which cites the Sodom and Gomorrah episode
at Genesis 19:1-29 in support of the proposition that the "practice is inherently inimical to
the general integrity of the human person." Id. at 1322.
178. See, e.g., M. VALENTE, SEX: THE RADICAL VIEW OF A CATHOLIC THEOLOGIAN
(1970); J. McNEILL, S.J., THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 89-107 (1976).
179. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM
AND THE CONSTITUTION 74-93 (1973); Henkin, Morals and the Constitution. The Sin of
Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1963).
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visions of the good life compatible with these values. These principles
require, inter alia, that any legally enforceable standards of conduct
must rest on generally acceptable empirical standards and must not
contravene the underlying values of equal concern and respect.
Sexual Autonomy, the Rational Choice of One's Self, and Human Rights
It is elementary that moral principles define the boundaries within
which a person may rationally pursue her or his ends. 180 For example,
human beings clearly possess much larger capacities for aggressiveness
than it is morally appropriate for them to develop and cultivate either
in themselves or in others. Accordingly, since applicable moral princi-
ples forbid the full development and display of these capacities, we do
not regard it as appropriate that individuals design their lives to give
such capacities full and untrammelled expression, however much in the
individual's interests this might be. An uncontroversial truth is the ex-
traordinary adaptability of human psychology compared to that of the
lower animals.' 81 Sacrifices of personal interests, regarded as unthink-
ably onerous and burdensome in a later historical period, are under-
taken with natural facility in an earlier period. To the extent that
applicable moral principles demand it, human nature can sustain quite
onerous demands, or, at least, demands eventually perceived to be
onerous.
Such shifts in the concept of morally permissible demands are well
illustrated by the kind of transvaluation of values that underlies the
development of the constitutional right to privacy. Certain ranges of
conduct, previously conceived as tightly regulated by moral principles,
are now no longer morally determined in the same way. For reasons
previously discussed, forms of sexual intimacy once judged immoral
per se are no longer so judged. 82 To the extent that moral principles
no longer rigidly prohibit certain forms of conduct, the scope of per-
missible liberty in rationally designing one's life is enlarged. Human
capacities, previously narrowly and rigidly confined, are now permissi-
bly cultivated and explored.
The right to privacy was recognized because it is associated with
and intended to facilitate the exercise of autonomy in certain basic
kinds of choice that bear upon the coherent rationality of a person's life
plan. Ordinary people, uncontaminated by philosophical discussions
180. See D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 75-91, 212-41 (1971).
181. On the contrasts of animal and human intelligence, see J. BENNETT, RATIONALITY
35-43, 80, 85, 94 (1964). For examples of the instinctive rigidities of animal behavior, see N.
TINBERGEN, THE HERRING GULL'S WORLD 28-32, 140-41, 144-45, 153, 186-210, 232-33
(1953).
182. See generally B. RUSSELL, MARRIAGE AND MORALS (1958); R. ATKINSON, SEXUAL
MORALITY (1965); J. WILSON, LOGIC AND SEXUAL MORALITY (1965).
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of personal identity, 183 typically identify other people (in response to
the query, who is x?) in certain characteristic ways. Certain choices in
life are taken to bear fundamentally on the entire design of one's life, 1
84
for these choices determine the basic decisions of work and love, which
in turn order many of the subsidiary choices of human life. Obvious
examples of such choices are matters of whether and where to be edu-
cated, choice of occupation and avocations, choice of whether and
whom to love and befriend and on what terms, and the decision
whether and to what extent children will be a life's concern. Classic
studies of the human life cycle make clear that the exercise of auton-
omy in life choices of these kinds occur throughout the life cycle.
85
Different sorts of choices cluster at different age periods: adolescents
struggle with basic questions of identity; 18 6 persons in their twenties
make basic decisions on the form of sexual love;18 7 the thirties appear
to mark crucial struggles for vocational competence and recognition; i88
the forties appear to call for realistic stock taking, concern for aiding
and teaching the young, 189 and so forth. From the earliest life of the
infant to quite old age, the development and exercise of autonomous
choice underlies the deepening individuation of the person.
Clearly there has been a transvaluation of values whereby many
traditional moral judgments regarding the proper exercise of these life
choices are no longer justified. In such cases, where reasonable moral
argument no longer can sustain absolute prohibitions and the issue in
question is one among the fundamental life choices, the constitutional
right to privacy, understood as a right of personal autonomy, finds its
natural home. It is natural to call this autonomy a right of privacy in
the sense that moral principles no longer define these matters as issues
of proper public concern but as matters of highly personal self-defini-
tion. The constitutional right to privacy as an autonomy right is pre-
mised on principles of obligation and duty that secure equal concern
and respect for autonomy. The right to privacy does not merely signify
that it is no longer not morally wrong to do certain things, but that
183. See note 44 & accompanying text supra. For examples of recent philosophical dis-
cussions of issues of personal identity, see B. WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 1-81 (1973);
PERSONAL IDENTITY (J. Perry ed. 1975); THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS (A.O. Rorty ed.,
1976).
184. See note 65 supra.
185. The major works include the following: E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY
(1963); E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE (1959); D. LEVINSON, THE SEASONS OF
A MAN'S LIFE (1978); G. VAILLANT, ADAPTATION TO LIFE (1977); R. WHITE, LIVES IN PRO-
GRESS (1952).
186. See E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE 101-64 (1959).
187. See E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 263-66 (1963); D. LEVINSON, THE
SEASONS OF A MAN'S LIFE 71-135 (1978).
188. See D. LEVINSON, THE SEASONS OF A MAN'S LIFE 139-88 (1978).
189. Id. at 191-313.
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there is an affirmative moral right to do them which it is, by definition,
a transgression of moral duty to violate.
In order to understand this claim, let us recall the contractarian
interpretation of the ultimate moral values of equal concern and re-
spect.' 90 It is argued that in the deliberations of the original position,
self-respect based on one's ability to exercise personal capacities com-
petently would have a special prominence and thus could be called the
primary human good. People desire general goods-liberties, opportu-
nities, wealth-in order to attain the self-respect that those conditions
facilitate. People in the original position would regulate access to the
general goods so as to enhance the possibility that each member of soci-
ety will be able to attain self-respect.
Another conclusion of contractarian theory is that, in reaching an
agreement upon a system of morality and justice, at least in an econom-
ically advanced society like the United States, people give priority to
the maximization of liberties. After a minimal level of wealth has been
secured to all people, the original contractors would not accept limita-
tions on their freedom in exchange for enhanced economic well-being.
Maximization of liberty best enables all people to attain self-respect by
opening up myriad possible areas of experience and endeavor. 191
The liberties distributed by the principles of justice typically in-
clude liberties of thought and expression (freedom of speech, press, re-
ligion, and association), civic rights (impartial administration of civil
and criminal law in defense of property and person), political rights
(the right to vote and participate in political affairs), and freedom of
physical, economic, and social movement. The importance of these lib-
erties rests on their relation to the primary good of self-respect, since
these liberties nurture personal competences, for example, full expres-
sion of the spirit, self-direction, security of the person, and the possibil-
ity of unhampered movement.' 92 In the United States, this has been
accomplished through the constitutional guarantees of the Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment. 93
Contemporary understanding of the strategic importance to self-
respect and personhood of sexual autonomy requires that we similarly
guarantee full liberty to enjoy and express love. At the core of this
understanding lies Freud's central idea, independently confirmed by
comparative ethology and anthropology,' 94 that human sexuality,
190. See text accompanying notes 56-65 supra.
191. See RAwLs, supra note 56, at 544.
192. For a fuller development of the moral theory of free speech, see Richards, Free
Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 45 (1974).
193. See generally, D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OFtLAW (1977).
194. See FORD & BEACH, supra note 101, at 199-267 (1951).
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rooted in the high degree of cortical control of sexuality, serves com-
plex imaginative and symbolic purposes, and thus is extraordinarily
plastic and malleable. 95 Freud thus introduced into scientific psychol-
ogy what artists have always known and expressed: that for humans to
experience sex is never, even in solitary masturbation, a purely physical
act, but is embued with complex evaluational interpretations of its real
or fantasied object, often rooted in the whole history of the person from
early childhood on.196 Freud's theory of the defenses clarifies some of
the imaginative manipulations of sexual feelings that are sometimes de-
structive, 197 but are also sometimes adaptive.198 For the latter, consider
Freud's own celebration of the eroticism of work that he called
sublimation. 199
Understanding of unconscious imaginative processes was, for
Freud, not a concessive plea for irrationalism but a deepening of our
understanding of the concept of autonomy and of the person; for
knowledge of the unconscious mind and its processes deepens the range
and strength of the ego or self in controlling id and superego impulses:
"Where id was, there shall ego be. '' 20° Through our self-conscious re-
trieval and investigation of the fantasy data of the unconscious
(dreams, free associations, slips, and the like), we may achieve a re-
markable capacity to deepen our control and understanding of mental
processes that are otherwise inexplicable, and often stupidly, rigidly,
and self-destructively repetitive. Through our knowledge of the uncon-
scious defenses and their form in our own lives, we are able to assess
consciously the work of the unconscious, deciding whether desires dis-
owned by the unconscious should be reclaimed (repression) or desires
promoted by the unconscious should be cut back (sublimation and pro-
195. "The sexual instinct.., is probably more strongly developed in man than in most
of the higher animals; it is certainly more constant, since it has almost entirely overcome the
periodicity to which it is tied in animals. It places extraordinarily large amounts of force at
the disposal of civilized activity, and it does this in virtue of its especially marked character-
istic of being able to displace its aim without materially diminishing in intensity. This ca-
pacity to exchange its original sexual aim for another one, which is no longer sexual but
which is psychically related to the first aim, is called the capacity for sublimation." S.
FREUD, "Civilized" Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, in 9 THE COMPLETE PSY-
CHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 181, 187 (Standard ed. 1908).
196. For an exploration of the importance of fantasy in human sexuality, see A.K. OF-
FIT, THE SEXUAL SELF 206-19 (1977).
197. See note 38 supra.
198. For a recent treatment of the changing and adaptive functions of defenses in the
context of the life cycle, see G. VAILLANT, ADAPTATION TO LIFE 75-126 (1977).
199. See note 195 supra. See generally, S. FREUD, Civilization and its Discontents, in 21
THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 64 (Standard ed. 1930).
200. See S. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, in 22 THE COMPLETE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORDS OF SIGMUND FREUD 80 (Standard ed. 1933).
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jection).201 We may, in addition, render ourselves self-conscious and
independent of our earliest most intense emotional identifications,
achieving an understanding of our life history so that we may see our
lives and what we want from them individually as our own and not as
the unconscious derivative of the wishes of significant others; with this
kind of understanding, we deepen our autonomy to decide with what
or with whom in our life history we will or will not identify or continue
to identify.20 2
To see human autonomy in this deeper way and to understand the
powerful role of sexuality as an independent force in the imaginative
life and general development of the person is to acknowledge the cen-
tral role of sexual autonomy in the idea of a free person.203 This view
of autonomy has necessary implications for the widening application of
human rights to sexuality. Sexuality, in this view, is not a spiritually
empty experience that the state may compulsorily legitimize only in the
form of rigid, marital procreational sex, but one of the fundamental
experiences through which, as an end in itself, people define the mean-
ing of their lives. Consider the following specific ways in which this is
SO.
First, sexual love is profoundly misdescribed by the sorrowing
Catholic dismissal of sexuality as an unfortunate and spiritually con-
comitant of propagation, for sexuality has for humans the independent
status of a profound ecstasy that makes available to a modem person
experiences increasingly inaccessible in public life: self-transcendence,
expression of private fantasy, release of inner tensions, and meaningful
and acceptable expression of regressive desires to be again the free
child-unafraid to lose control, playful, vulnerable, spontaneous, sen-
sually loved.2°4 While people may choose to forego this experience,
any coercive prohibition of it amounts to the deprivation of an experi-
ence central in human significance.
Second, sexual love is sometimes a crucial ingredient in forming
lasting personal relationships and thus can facilitate the good that these
relationships afford in human life.20 5 Such durable relationships
founded on sexual intimacy are happily denominated a form of knowl-
201. See A. FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE ch. 4 (C. Baines
trans. 1946).
202. For an example of a possibly self-destructive identification that may profitably be
undone, see the discussion of identification with the aggressor, id., ch. 9.
203. The argument here interprets the idea of sexual autonomy in terms of sexual love,
but it may be interpreted to apply to eroticism per se without lover either in noncommercial
or commercial forms. See Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: a Moral
Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution,- U. PA. L. REV.- (forthcoming).
204. See M. BALINT, PRIMARY LOVE AND PSYCHOANALYTIC TECHNIQUE 109-17 (1952).
205. On the values of these relationships, see S. Bern, Privacy, Freedom, and Respectfor
Persons, in PRIVACY 16 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971).
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edge, in Biblical locution, for they afford to people the capacity for a
secure disclosure of self, not only through exposure of sexual vulnera-
bilities, but also through the sharing of recesses of the self otherwise
remote and inaccessible.206 Accordingly, choices involving these rela-
tionships are among the most important strategic decisions in one's life
plan.20 7 The choice of one's lover, whether in or outside marriage, in-
volves one's entire self-conception. As one major recent study of the
human life cycle clarifies, the choice of one's lover is one with one's life
"dream";208 as the "dream" changes, so must the relationship.209 The
disclosure of self that love involves, the mutual shaping of expectations
and life styles, the sharing of common aspirations and hopes-all these,
and others, suggest the extraordinary significance of decisions about
matters of love in the design of a human life.
Third, the force of sexual love in human life expresses itself in the
desire to participate with the beloved in the development of and care
for common projects created by the relationship.210 Some of these
projects take on a durable character in terms of objects or activities or
even persons who survive the relationship. In so doing they embody
the lasting value of the relationship and perhaps thus satisfy, in some
measure, the longing of human self-consciousness for evidence of the
immortal and imperishable self.
In summary, one may appeal to the plausible thought that love is
part of what is commonly meant by the meaning of life. Surely, such
love may not necessarily take sexual forms; it may, for example, take
the form of a diffuse benevolence toward larger or smaller groups of
people, or even devotion to an abstract entity. But, the absence of love
in any form from a human life renders a life plan incoherently empty at
its core and the life of the spirit deformed and miserably twisted.
Love plays a role, too, in the contractarian model. As noted ear-
lier, that choice in the original position is choice under uncertainty:
rational people in the original position have no way of predicting the
probability that they may end up in any given situation of life. By
definition, none of the contractors knows his or her own sex, age, native
206. See C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES, ch. 9 (1970).
207. The gravity of this choice was stressed as early as Aristotle's seminal discussion of
friendship. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. 8 (H. Rackham trans. 1926); cf. D.
RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 266-67 (1971).
208. See D. LEVINSON, THE SEASONS OF A MAN'S LIFE 91-111 (1978).
209. Id. at 237, 245-51.
210. The thought that falling in love involves thinking of the love object as the parent of
a common child, understood physically or metaphorically as a common interest fostered by
the relationship, is as old as Plato. PLATO, SYMPOSIUM § 206c; for other statements of this
view, see M. SCHELER, THE NATURE OF SYMPATHY (P. Heath trans. 1954); A.
SCHOPENHAUER, 2 THE WORLD AS WILL AND REPRESENTATION 531-67 (E. Payne trans.
1966).
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talents, particular capacity for self-control, social or economic class or
position, or in general the particular forms of his or her personal
desires (e.g., whether one likes asparagus or spinach; or is homosexual
or heterosexual). Each contractor will be concerned not to end up in a
disadvantaged situation with no appeal to moral principles to denounce
deprivations that may render life's prospects bitter and mean. To avoid
such consequences, the rational strategy in choosing the basic princi-
ples of justice would be the "maximin" strategy.
21'
As we have suggested, the contractors in the original position
would regard self-respect as the primary good. Accordingly, their focus
would be on principles that would ensure that people have the maxi-
mum chance of attaining self-respect. Sexual autonomy, the capacity
to choose whether or how or with whom one will have sexual relations,
is, for reasons previously discussed, one crucial ingredient of this self-
respect; it is one of the forms of personal competence in: terms of which
people regulate basic issues of what kind of person they will be. Be-
cause liberties, opportunities, and capacities relating to love figure so
importantly in the quest for self-respect, the rational contractors would
not agree to any principle that would permit restrictions upon these
liberties, opportunities, and capacities which were not compatible with
the greatest equal liberty for all. Use of the "maximin" strategy in
choosing principles relating to liberty, opportunity, and capacity to
love, then, tends to eliminate the disadvantaged class: the lowest (as
well as the highest) condition is equality for all persons.
2 12
Because of the profound relation of sexual autonomy to basic self-
respect, the following principle of obligation and duty, defining correla-
tive human rights, would be accepted in the original position-theprin-
cople of love as a civil liberty. Basic institutions are to be arranged so
that every person is guaranteed the greatest equal liberty, opportunity
and capacity to love, compatible with a like liberty, opportunity and
capacity for all.
The derivation of this principle, being a specification of the more
general principles of justice, depends on the preliminary assumption
that the contractors are ignorant of their specific identity and can only
take into account facts subject to general empirical validation. The
contractors thus cannot appeal to special religious duties to procreate to
override the equal liberty to love; nor can there be appeals to any taste
or distaste for certain forms of the physical expression of love in order
to override the equal liberty to love; nor can they appeal to concepts of
love that illegitimately smuggle in covert premises or prejudices of such
kinds. The concept of love says nothing about the form of its physical
expression other than, for example, that it involves forms of intimate
211. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
212. Cf. Unnatural Acts, supra note 9, at 1310-12.
closeness expressing the evident intention of good to another. There is
no ideal, exclusive, or proper physical expression of sexual love, be-
cause a large and indeterminate class of forms of sexual intercourse is
compatible with the aims of love.
This principle explains and justifies the sense in which the consti-
tutional right to privacy is a right. The constitutional concept expresses
an underlying moral principle resting on the enhancement of sexual
autonomy, the self-determination of the role of sexuality in one's life
which protects the values foundational to the concept of human rights,
equal concern and respect for autonomy. Accordingly, in the absence
of countervailing moral argument, laws which determine how one will
have sex and with what consequences are constitutionally invalid.
Such considerations explain the unconstitutionality of laws proscribing
contraception, abortion, and the use of pornography in the home.
213
They also explain why antihomosexuality laws violate a constitutional
right.
Freedom to love means that a mature individual must have auton-
omy to decide how or whether to love another.214 Restrictions on the
form of love imposed in the name of the distorting rigidities of conven-
tion that bear no relation to individual emotional capacities and needs
would be condemned. Individual autonomy, in matters of love, would
ensure the development of people who could call their emotional na-
ture their own, secure in the development of attachments that bear the
mark of spontaneous human feeling and that touch one's original im-
pulses. In contrast, restrictions on this individual autonomy would
starve one's emotional capacities, withering individual feeling into con-
ventional gesture and strong native pleasures into vicarious
fantasies.
215
Antihomosexuality laws egregiously violate these considerations.
First, laws prohibiting homosexual conduct inhibit persons inclined to-
ward this form of sexual activity from obtaining sexual satisfaction in
the only way they find natural. Second, these laws probably encourage
blackmail by providing a means by which homosexuals can be
threatened with exposure and prosecution. Such vulnerability to black-
mail may discourage employers from hiring homosexuals, on the
ground that they are security risks.216 Third, laws prohibiting consen-
213. See notes 105-06 & accompanying text supra.
214. Compare Fourier's striking conception that, just as the utopian state has a duty to
supply a minimum of food, it has a duty to supply a minimum of sexual gratification to all
citizens. C. FOURIER, THE UTOPIAN VISION OF CHARLES FOURIER 336-40 (J. Beecher & R.
Bienvenu eds. 1971).
215. See also the similar arguments in On Liberty, supra note 146, ch. 3.
216. See Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges. The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons
in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 829-37 (1979); Note, Security Clearancesfor
Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L. REV. 403, 410-11 (1973).
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sual adult homosexual activity provide a ground for discrimination
against people of homosexual preference in employment, housing, and
public accommodation.
217
Consider the effects of such laws on exclusive homosexuals who
alone find homosexual relations naturally satisfying. Traditionally,
these individuals do one of three things. First, they may utterly disown
sexuality and the sexual aspect of their selves, dedicating themselves,
perhaps to an impersonal benevolence. 218 Second, they may heterosex-
ually marry, using homosexual fantasies when engaging in sex with
their spouse. 219 Third, they may be practicing covert homosexuals ei-
ther exclusively or in some combination with the second alternative.220
Each of these options, compelled by the state of the law, outrageously
violates human rights.
First, the legal compulsion of celibacy, in the absence of any good
reason, unfairly compels homosexuals to personal sacrifices which
would be regarded as unthinkable if demanded of heterosexuals. Of
course, celibacy may be, for some people, a rational life choice. But, to
compel people to disown their most basic emotional propensities is to
demand that life be only gesturally lived behind impersonal masks,
that expression be always artfully choreographed and never naturally
spontaneous, and that the body be experienced as an empty
sepulchre. 221
217. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1973, § 4, at 5, col. 1. Engaging in any homosexual activ-
ity still conclusively bars an individual from admission to the military. R. MITCHELL, THE
HOMOSEXUAL AND THE LAW 49-50 (1969). Some courts have allowed a general presump-
tion that the commission of homosexual acts makes one unfit for government service. See
Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039
(1970). But cf Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Acanfora v. Board of Educ.,
359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), affd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 836 (1974); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 175 (1969). See generally Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 829-37 (1979). For an argu-
ment that homosexuality should be a constitutionally suspect classification, see D. RICH-
ARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 162-78 (1971).
218. See, e.g., J. MCNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 164-72 (1976).
219. See note 159 supra.
220. See notes 157 & 159 supra.
221. Of the conventional idea "that all who do not contract a legal marriage shall re-
main abstinent throughout their lives," Freud observed: "The position, agreeable to all the
authorities, that sexual abstinence is not harmful and not difficult to maintain, has also been
widely supported by the medical profession. It may be asserted, however, that the task of
mastering such a powerful impulse as that of the sexual instinct by any other means than
satisfying it is one which can call for the whole of a man's forces. Mastering it by sublima-
tion, by deflecting the sexual instinctual forces away from their sexual aim to higher cultural
aims, can be achieved by a minority and then only intermittently, and least easily during the
period of ardent and vigorous youth. Most of the rest become neurotic or are harmed in one
way or another. Experience shows that the majority of the people who make up our society
are constitutionally unfit to face the task of abstinence." S. Freud, "Civilized" Sexual Moral-
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Second, the experience of heterosexual marriage without natural
eroticism is hollow, frequently leading to marital instability and di-
vorce, both of which may be damaging to the children. 222 In the place
of the kinds of relationships found natural, homosexuals fail to experi-
ence forms of deep personal release, pointlessly and sometimes dishon-
estly inflict harms on others, as they inflict on themselves unnecessary
burdens of self-sacrifice.
Third, the cumulative effect of antihomosexuality laws is to de-
prive practicing homosexuals of the experience of a secure self-respect
in their competence in building personal relationships. The degree of
emotional sacrifice thus exacted for no defensible reason seems among
the most unjust deprivations that law can compel.2 23 Persons are de-
prived of a realistic basis for confidence and security in their most basic
emotional propensities. Criminal penalty, employment risks, and so-
cial prejudice converge to render dubious a person's most spontaneous
native urges, dividing emotions, physical expression and self-image in a
cruelly gratuitous way.22 4 The deepest damage is to the spiritual and
imaginative dimension that gives human sexual love its significance.
Persons surrounded by false social conceptions that are supported by
law find it difficult to esteem their own emotional propensities and nat-
ural expression. Without such self-esteem love finds no meaningful or
enduring object. Instead of being assured a fair opportunity to develop
loving capacities and fair access to love, the homosexual's capacity to
express such feelings is driven into a secretive and concealed world of
shallow and often anonymous physical encounters. 22 5 The achieve-
ment of emotional relationships of any depth or permanence is made a
matter of heroic individual effort when it could, like heterosexual rela-
tions, be part of the warp and woof of the ordinary social possibility.
22 6
ity and Modern Nervous Illness, in 9 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND
FREUD 193 (Standard ed. 1908).
The recent Kinsey Institute study of homosexuals indicates that the Asexuals are a rela-
tively dispirited and depressed lot. See BELL & WEINBERG, supra note 117, at 226-28.
222. There is evidence that heterosexual marriages of exclusive homosexuals typically
end unhappily for all concerned. One authority, for example, reports that one-third of the
divorce cases he handled arose from the homosexuality of one of the parties. See J. Mc-
NEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 136 (1976). The recent Kinsey Institute study
confirms the short-lived character of homosexual marriages. See BELL & WEINBERG, supra
note 117, at 160-70.
223. See generally H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 22 (1963); G. WEINBERG,
SOCIETY AND THE HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL 78-82, 142-43 (1972).
224. See generally HOFFMAN, supra note 115. For an account of the damaging effects of
prejudice on the self-conception of the group discriminated against, see G. ALLPORT, THE
NATURE OF PREJUDICE ch. 9 (1954).
225. See BELL & WEINBERG, supra note 117, at 81-102; HOFFMAN, supra note 115; L.
HUMPHREYS, TEAROOM TRADE 1-15 (1970).
226. See Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973). But cf.
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In thus forbidding exclusive homosexuals to express sexual love in the




Even if no other moral judgment may appropriately be made
about the probity of certain conduct, we may still believe that such con-
duct is sufficiently irrational to permit interference on paternalistic
grounds.
Clearly, the contractarian model as used to articulate a structure of
reasons expressing mutual concern and respect, universalization, andminimization of natural fortuity, would justify a principle of paternal-
ism and explain its proper scope and limits. From the point of view of
the original position, the contractors would know that human beings
would be subject to certain kinds of irrationalities with severe conse-
quences, including death and the permanent impairment of health, and
they would, accordingly, agree on an insurance principle against cer-
tain of these more serious irrationalities in the event they might occur
to them.228
There are two critical constraints on the scope of such a principle.
First, the relevant idea of irrationality cannot itself violate the con-
straints of morality. Legally enforceable moral ideas must be formu-
lated with ignorance of specific identity and must be based on facts
capable of empirical validation; in particular, idiosyncratic personal
values cannot be smuggled into the content of "irrationality" that de-
fines, inter alia, the scope of the principle. Rather, the notion of irra-
tionality must be defined in terms of a neutral theory that can
accommodate the many visions of the good life that are compatible
with moral constraints. For this purpose, the idea of rationality is de-
fined relative to an agent's system of ends, as determined by the agent's
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d
185 (1971).
227. See notes 204-212 & accompanying text supra. The recent Kinsey Institute study of
homosexuality indicates that the Close-Coupleds, who maintain relatively monogamous sta-
ble relationships, appear to be psychologically better fit, on the whole, than other homosexu-
als. BELL & WEINBERG, supra note 115, at 219-21. Male homosexuals appear to have more
difficulty in forming and maintaining such unions than lesbians. Id. at 81-102. Bell &
Weinberg suggest that this difference appears to be due to the greater societal condemnation
of male homosexuality which inhibits men from forming such unions either expressly
through fear of various legal, economic, or social sanctions or psychologically through inter-
nalization of self-hating stereotypes which defensively overvalue the sexist masculine role as
sexual predator, not sensitive lover. Id. at 101-02.
228. For similar arguments to this effect, see D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR
ACTION 192-95 (1971); G. Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107-26 (R.
Wasserstrom ed. 1971); cf. Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CAN. J. PHIL. 105-24 (1971).
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appetites, desires, capacities, aspirations, and the like. The principles
of rational choice specify the most coherent and satisfying plan of ac-
commodating the agent's ends over time.229 Accordingly, only those
acts are irrational which frustrate the agent's own system of ends,
whatever those ends are. Paternalistic considerations come into play
only when irrationalities of these kinds exist (for example, the agent's
jumping out the window will cause his death, which the agent does not
want but which he falsely believes will not occur). Second, within the
class of irrationalities so defined, paternalistic considerations would
only properly come into play when the irrationality was severe and sys-
tematic (due to undeveloped or impaired capacities, or lack of opportu-
nity to exercise such capacities) and a severe and permanent
impairment of interests was in prospect. Interference in irrationalities
outside the scope of this second constraint is forbidden in large part
because allowing people to make and learn from their own mistakes is
a crucial part of the development of mature autonomy.
230
When we examine the application of paternalistic considerations
of these kinds to basic life choices, we face the question of how to assess
the rationality of these kinds of choices. Again, the idea of rationality,
employed in the context of life choices, importantly takes as the funda-
mental datum the agent's ends, as determined by his or her appetites,
desires, aspirations, capacities, and the like. In such contexts principles
of rational choice call for the assessment of basic life choices (for exam-
ple, choice of occupation) in terms of effects over time, since such
choices determine a number of subchoices having effects throughout
the agent's life and indeed may determine the duration of that life.2 3'
Such choices are assessed in terms of the degree to which they satisfy
the system of the agent's ends over time (for example, whether they call
upon the exercise of competences which the agent could take pleasure
in over a lifetime, the degree to which human contacts satisfy whatever
one's desires for sociability are, the level of remuneration in relation to
the level of satisfaction of other wants, the degree of leisure to pursue
and cultivate avocations or personal interests, and the like). Since the
agent's ends over time are often quite complex and difficult to antici-
pate with exactitude, a number of such choices may be or seem equally
rational. Nonetheless, there is a coherent sense to the application of
229. For a more detailed development of this account of rationality, see D. RICHARDS,
A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 27-71 (1971).
230. In addition, this requirement is justified by the fact that the agent is typically in the
better position to judge his or her own ends, and thus a person's interests are best advanced
by limiting any principle of paternalistic interference only to where the probability of third
party error is clearly outweighed by extremes of palpable irrationality and severe harm. See
id. at 193.
231. For an exploration of the role of mortality in life plans, see C. FRIED, AN ANAT-
OMY OF VALUES 155-82 (1970).
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rationality criteria to such choices. Some such choices are clearly irra-
tional if they, compared to other available alternative plans, frustrate
the agent's every significant end.232 Such choices, if they satisfy the
stringent constraints of the principle discussed above, may be the
proper object of paternalistic interference.
As we have seen, one radically inappropriate form of paternalistic
interference is that which is grounded in the substitution of the inter-
ferer's own personal ends for the ends of the agent. This form is objec-
tionable because it does not take seriously the fundamental datum of
proper paternalism-that the agent's ends are given and that the agent
acts irrationally only when his action frustrates those ends. This form
of inappropriateness is, I believe, a general problem in the paternalistic
assessment of life choices, for in this context people find it all too natu-
ral facilely to substitute their own personal solutions for the kind of
imaginative understanding of the perspectives of others required prop-
erly to examine these matters. The temptations to such paternalistic
distortions are irresistibly strong in cases properly covered by the con-
stitutional right to privacy, which is, in part, to be understood as a pro-
phylaxis against such abuses.
No good argument can be made that paternalistic considerations
would justify interferences in basic choices such as whether to marry,
bear children or be heterosexual. Indeed, in many cases such choices
seem clearly rational. There is widespread consensus that it is rational
for many people to limit family size by contraceptives; in such ways,
people satisfy their desires for having children and have additional re-
sources better to advance their ends in general. It is no more irrational,
I believe, to suppose that for some people not having children would
better advance their ends; whatever ends having children advances can
be secured in alternative ways (for example, being in a profession that
cares for the young, investing one's immortal longings in other forms of
enduring projects, etc.) and not having children may free people to ad-
vance their own and others' good in ways otherwise improbable. Fi-
nally, the idea that it is per se irrational to engage in homosexual
relations is no more defensible. Suppose one is an exclusive homosex-
ual, who from early age has experienced natural eroticism either in fact
or in fantasy,23 3 only with people of the same gender. Such an individ-
ual experiences spontaneous self-expression and fulfillment and mean-
ingful relations only in homosexual relations. Since love is such a
fundamental good in human life, it would surely be rational to develop
a personal life in which one's natural sexual self can find meaningful
expression. The idea of change of sexual preference is unacceptable
232. One plan dominates the other in terms of rationality criteria. See D. RICHARDS, A
THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 28, 40-3 (1971).
233. See note 125 supra.
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not merely because it is painful and probably doomed to failure2 34 but
because, given the depth of sexuality, it would transmogrify the self in
which one has self-esteem. The appeal to social opprobrium rests on a
circular appeal to the still extant force of invalid and unjust moral
judgments. It is simply not irrational to refuse to sacrifice the founda-
tions of one's personal happiness to vicious social prejudices, for such
sacrifices degrade the foundations of autonomous self-respect and thus
reduce freedom to cowardly, servile, and fear-ridden conventionalism.
For many, such a life is simply not worth living. How, then, are we
even to understand the invocation of paternalistic arguments of irra-
tionality in this context? The answer, I believe, is that in making such
judgments people do not take seriously or responsibly what it is to be
the agent, in this case, an exclusive homosexual. They suppose that
these people are somehow real heterosexuals who must be prodded to
realize their latent desires. This fantasy cannot be sustained as an em-
pirical proposition; it is simply a make-weight psychiatric correlate to
already accepted moral judgments. 2 35 This substitution of personal
234. See note 126 supra.
235. A striking form of this fallacy appears in one psychiatric formulation of the aetio-
logical theory that homosexuality originates in very early parent-child relationships. In the
case of male homosexuality, that theory hypothesizes a seductive, over-attached, domineer-
ing mother and a detached, hostile or remote father. See I. BIEBER, HOMOSEXUALITY: A
PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALS 3 10-13 (1962). From such an aetiologi-
cal explanation, Bieber fallaciously infers that homosexuality is a disturbance of people's
naturally heterosexual underlying impulses which can easily be given expression if certain
fears are overcome. Id. at 220-54. Freud, of course, had originated this form of aetiological
explanation of homosexual preference. See generally S. FREUD, Leonardo da Vinci and a
Memory of his Childhood, in 11 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND
FREUD 63-137 (Standard ed. 1910). But, he insisted throughout his writings that there was
no original or natural direction of sexual preference, but rather an undifferentiated original
bisexuality. See, e.g., S. FREUD, Three Essays on Sexuality, in 7 THE COMPLETE PSYCHO-
LOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 219-20 (Standard ed. 1905); An Outline of
Psychoanalysis, in 23 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 188
(Standard ed. 1940). This original bisexuality was shaped, for Freud, by early social experi-
ence into the relevant forms of sexual preference in later life. Let us assume, arguendo, that
this general form of aetiological explanation is true. See S. FISHER & R.P. GREENBERG. THE
SCIENTIFIC CREDIBIUTY OF FREUD'S THEORIES AND THERAPY 231-54 (1977); cf note 125
supra. It does not follow that because Male homosexual preference originates from a domi-
neering mother and remote father that there is a latent heterosexual bent underneath any
more than the origin of male heterosexuality in a domineering father and affectionate
mother shows a latent homosexual bent beneath. Nothing follows from either aetiological
explanation about the natural underlying primacy of either preference, as Freud well under-
stood. For Freud, it is a general truth that sexual development originates in primitive con-
fficts in the family. The form of these conflicts, whether leading to homosexual or
heterosexual preference, was of therapeutic interest only in the presence of neurotic symp-
toms. See note 117 supra. Bieber's interpretation and the correlative "disease" theory of
homosexuality have now been largely repudiated by psychiatrists. Id They represent, I be-
lieve, a striking example of Kinsey's caveat: "Nothing has done more to block the free inves-
tigation of sexual behavior than the almost universal acceptance, even among scientists, of
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values for the ends of the agent is, of course, improper paternalism.
The development of the constitutional right to privacy is, in part, to be
understood as a bar to such arguments, allowing the agent the scope of
personal autonomy in these matters that is their moral and human
right.
It is fair to regard the judgments of conventional family life as "the
meaning of life" as a kind of metaphysical familism. It is, however,
important to see the limited force that such normative judgments
should be accorded. Certainly, such normative judgments are impor-
tant and deeply significant; indeed, nothing can be more important to
individuals than basic life choices. But it is crucial to see that such
judgments are not properly regarded as ethical or moral judgments, in
the sense of expressing moral requirements applicable at large on the
basis of mutual concern and respect, universalization, and minimiza-
tion of fortuity.236 Undoubtedly, in making basic life choices, we as-
sume moral principles of such kinds as background conditions; we
assume, typically, that none of the available life choices violates moral
requirements. But the substance of such life choices is not dictated by
such ethical boundary conditions. Rather, typically, we are morally at
liberty to adopt any of a number of life plans. In an important sense,
then, metaphysical familism is an expression of a nonethical judgment,
a view of the more satisfying, and thus more rational, basic life plan.
Accordingly, such judgments are entitled to no more legal or constitu-
tional force than any other ideological vision of the good life not dic-
tated by ethical principles. In particular, it is deeply mistaken to
confuse the moral depth of the constitutional right to privacy, as a right
to autonomy, with the ideology of metaphysical familism.
23 7
Such confusions are, of course, familiar to many moral traditions.
One thinks, for example, of the many religious codes of detailed casu-
istry that regulate, in the name of "morality," the most detailed features
certain aspects of that behavior as normal, and of other aspects of that behavior as abnor-
mal. The similarity of distinctions between the terms normal and abnormal, and the terms
right and wrong, amply demonstrates the philosophic, religious, and cultural origins of these
concepts. . . and the ready acceptance of those distinctions among scientific men may pro-
vide the basis for one of the severest criticisms which subsequent generations can make of
the scientific quality of nineteenth century and early twentieth century scientists." KINSEY,
supra note 115, at 7.
236. See D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR AcTiON 231-32 (1971).
237. This deplorable confusion arguably underlies the Supreme Court's recent statement
that the constitutional right to privacy had never been found to protect the private consen-
sual sexual relations of adults. Carey v. Population Serv., 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977). If
the constitutional right to privacy is limited to family-linked rights of child rearing, the
ideology of metaphysical familism will become the measure of constitutionally enforceable
morality in violation of the deepest constitutional values of autonomous self-definition and
self-respect.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
of people's quite personal lives.238 In an earlier discussion, I discussed
a philosophical form of this confusion, namely, Plato's idea that there
are no limits to legitimate state paternalism. 239 Against such views
stands the radical vision of autonomy and mutual concern and respect,
which accords to persons as such the right to create their own lives on
terms fair to all. To see people in this way is to affirm basic intrinsic
limits on the degree to which, even benevolently, one person may con-
trol the life of another. Within ethical constraints, people are free to
adopt a number of disparate and irreconciliable visions of the good life.
Indeed, the adoption of different kinds of life plans, within these con-
straints, affords the moral good of different experiments in living by
which people can more rationally assess such basic life choices. 240
Since rigid moral prescriptions in many of these areas are no longer
appropriate, people should make these choices in as imaginative, crea-
tive, exploratory, and inventive a way as human wit can devise, con-
sulting one's personal desires, wants, needs, competences and how one
most harmoniously wishes them concurrently and complementarily to
develop and be satisfied over a life time. Perhaps, people fear freedom
in this sense, 24 1 preferring conventional solutions. That is their right.
But, such choices deserve no special moral approbation; they do not
help us more rationally and courageously to choose our lives. In this
sense, the constitutional right to privacy protects not only the auton-
omy rights of individuals, but facilitates the social and moral good that
experiments in living afford to society at large-refreshing and deepen-
ing the social imagination about the role of children in human life,
about the improper force of "masculine" and "feminine" stereotypes in
human love and work,242 and about the-varieties of humane sexual
arrangements.
243
In Conclusion: The Judicial Methodology of the Constitutional
Right to Privacy
We have proposed a theory of the form of considerations which
must be assessed considering issues involving the constitutional right to
privacy, namely, (1) whether, in the light of contemporary evidence,
there is any good moral reason to believe that certain conduct, tradi-
tionally conceived as morally wrong, is wrong at all; (2) whether the
conduct relates to basic life plan choices; and (3) consequent on (2),
whether paternalistic considerations are radically inappropriate. I do
238. See, e.g., T.L. BOUSCAREN, A. ELLIS & F. KORTH, CANON LAW (1946).
239. See notes 44-7 & accompanying text supra.
240. See On Liberiy, supra note 146, ch. 3.
241. See E. FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (1941).
242. See note 168 supra.
243. See, e.g., R. BRAIN, FRIENDS AND LOVERS (1977).
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not mean to suggest that these considerations must, concurrently, deter-
mine the future development of the constitutional right to privacy. Per-
haps, for example, if (1) and (3) are clear, that should suffice for
constitutional invalidation on the ground if not of the constitutional
right to privacy, then the total lack of sensible due process rational-
ity.244 Nevertheless, I believe the above considerations do explain the
proper development to date of the constitutional right to privacy 245 and
the proper direction of its continued development.
This Article began by taking up the familiar challenge that the
constitutional right to privacy is unsound in principle and methodol-
ogy. The author has discussed at some length the substantive basis of
constitutional principles on which the constitutional right to privacy
244. Cf. Craven, Personhood" The Right to Be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699.
245. How does this analysis apply outside the sexual context, for example, to allegations
of a constitutional right to privacy to use drugs, see note 9 supra, to wear certain styles of
dress or hair length, see note 8 supra, to the right to die, see note 10 supra? Certainly, there
is no good reason why the constitutional right to privacy must be limited to sex though it
understandably began there. Nonsexual applications of the right to privacy may be ana-
lyzed on the same model earlier applied to sex. This model most clearly would justify the
idea of a constitutional privacy right to die. As regards (I), absolute moral prohibitions on
forms of voluntary death are, I believe, unjustified. See D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REA-
SONS FOR ACTION 1976-85 (1971). Such absolute prohibitions can only be sustained on the
theological assumption that God has a supervening property right in our bodies which we,
the person in that body, have no moral title to alienate. Id. at 179-80. For reasons previ-
ously discussed, such purely theological assumptions cannot properly be the basis for legally
enforceable morality. Accordingly, in certain cases, voluntary death is not morally wrong.
(2) The duration of one's life is a basic life choice, if anything is. Certainly, many of the
choices in our life are informed by our decision on this question, for example, our choice of
job with its predictable effects on the duration of our life, our concern for personal health
and diet, our present prescient planning for old age, and the like all bear on the duration of
one's life (see note 231 supra). No one would question the right to control the duration of
one's life in these senses. In certain kinds of cases of terminal illness, and the like, there is no
moral difference in principle. To refuse people the right to die in such cases is to fail to
accord them equal concern and respect for their autonomy. (3) Paternalistic judgments in
certain of these cases are radically inappropriate. In particular, fear of one's own death
often unwarrantably distorts one's perception of another person's rationality in wanting to
die. Compare the distortions of judgment of physicians regarding whether terminally ill
patients want to be told of their probable deaths. See S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 220-47 (1978).
Other nonsexual applications of the constitutional right to privacy (dress and hair
length, drug use) may satisfy (I) and (3), but may be controverted on the issue of whether
they bear on basic life choices. Perhaps a good argument could be made that dress and hair
length are important ways in which human beings define themselves and must thus be re-
garded as basic life choices. See, eg., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 958-65
(1978). Perhaps, soft drug use could be regarded as a form of autonomous control of inter-
nal psychic space and attitudes, and thus be fit within the rubric of (2). Id. at 905-10. On
the other hand, these arguments may be strained. In such cases, as I suggested above, the
invalidation of such laws may sufficiently rest on their violation of (1) and (3), as egregiously
lacking any semblance of minimal due process rationality. See note 244 supra.
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rests, and this analysis may now be used in explaining why the judicial
methodology, used in inferring the right, is sound.
Substantively, we have argued that there is an inner moral coher-
ence in the development of the right to privacy. Beginning in the inter-
stices of tort law, used in the interpretation of specific constitutional
guarantees, finally invoked as an independent constitutional right-the
right to privacy has appealed to a common moral argument, that is, the
interpretation of basic rights in terms of the foundational values of au-
tonomy and equal concern and respect. When Warren and Brandeis
invoked ideas of the inviolate personality in their seminal article,
246
they appealed to underlying concepts of human rights that, in their
view, most deeply explain the moral foundations of tort law and the
proper direction in which tort law should judicially evolve. When
Brandeis invoked similar arguments in his dissent in Olmstead,247 he
made an argument of basic moral principle that he supposed to under-
lie the fourth amendment and the constitutional design in general.
These arguments express the ultimate moral vision of human
rights-that there are intrinsic limits on the power of individuals and
the state to violate basic interests of the person. Legal doctrines, ex-
pressing ideas of human rights, are thus interpreted in terms of the un-
derlying moral concepts which give these doctrines some ultimate
coherent sense. Accordingly, when Justice Douglas inferred the consti-
tutional right to privacy in Griswold,248 he correctly appealed, like
Brandeis, to an underlying argument of moral principle that he took to
explain a number of constitutional provisions and the constitutional
design in general. This underlying argument is here called the unwrit-
ten constitution, a body of understandings that gives a coherent mean-
ing to the constitutional design. This meaning is the basic
constitutional commitment to the ultimate values of human rights, the
guarantee to persons of effective institutional respect for their capaci-
ties, as free and rational beings, to define the meaning of their own
lives. Like the Warren and Brandeis article and the Brandeis dissent
and like good judges in general,249 Douglas thus made sense of existing
legal materials in terms of underlying principles and showed how those
principles make sense today. Constitutional principles, insuring equal
concern and respect for autonomy, require the invalidation of state
prohibitions and regulations in matters not properly of public concern
(antimoralism and antipaternalism) and implicating basic issues of the
246. See note 66 supra.
247. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
248. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
249. See Richards, The Theory of Adjudication and the Task of the Great
Judge,--CARDozo L. REv.-(forthcoming). See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
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definition of the self. Accordingly, the constitutional right to privacy
was inferred. 250 Whether derived as an implication of various amend-
ments,251 as a right reserved to the people by the ninth amendment,
252
or as a substantive right required by due process of law,253 the constitu-
tional right to privacy makes ultimate moral sense of the constitutional
design.
Of course, as we have noted, the constitutional right to privacy is
analytically distinguishable from the informational control issues of the
tort and fourth amendment concepts.254 The unity of these disparate
rights is not in the definition of the ultimate rights, but in the common
moral arguments they invoke: the concern for the exacting protection
of matters not properly of public concern, in the interest of protecting
the ultimate resources of individuation that lie at the heart of the con-
cept of human rights. Accordingly, the judicial methodology of
Griswold and its progeny is eminently proper. Analogies are properly
drawn to the privacy interests protected by tort law and the fourth
amendment, not because the constitutional right to privacy is the same
right as these but because there is an underlying moral principle that
the analogy clarifies.
255
The critics of the constitutional right to privacy are wrong.256 It is
they, not the Court, who have lost touch with the moral vision underly-
ing the constitutional design. The institutional protection of moral per-
sonality requires that this right be recognized. A case like Doe
257
shows not that the constitutional right to privacy is incoherent, but that
the Court has failed consistently to apply or articulately to understand
250. This account is an attempt to render more philosophically precise accounts with
which I am morally sympathetic. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch. 15
(1978); Craven, Personhood" The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699; Gerety, Redefin-
ing Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233 (1977); Comment, 4 Taxonomy of Privacy:
Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 1447 (1976).
251. Thus, Justice Douglas inferred the constitutional right to privacy as being in the
"penumbra" formed by emanations of specific constitutional guarantees. Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
252. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); cf.
Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights... Retained by the People", 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 787
(1962).
253. Due process of law should be explicated as the ultimate and most general require-
ment of constitutional reasonableness, requiring that all laws have reasons compatible with
basic constitutional morality. Accordingly, any laws incompatible with such reasons should
be subject to possible invalidations. Cf Scanlon, Due Process, in DUE PROCESS: NoMos
XVIII, at 93 (J.R. Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds. 1977); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539-55
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
254. See note 73 & accompanying text supra.
255. See UnnaturalActs, supra note 9, at 1318-19 for elaboration of these analogies.
256. See note 2 supra.
257. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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its underlying principle. Doe is deeply, morally wrong. Sexual auton-
omy is a human right in terms of which people define the meaning of
their lives. In particular, the persecution of homosexuals, for that is the
name we may now properly give it, deserves not constitutional valida-
tion, but systematic and unremitting attack. To appeal to popular atti-
tudes, in the way in which Doe implicitly does, is precisely to withhold
human rights when, as a shield against majoritarian oppression, they
are most exigently needed. Homosexuals have the right to reclaim the
aspects of the self that society has traditionally compelled them to
deny; they, like other persons, have the right to center work and love in
a life they can authentically call their own.
